depicted typical confrontation between good and evil. Whereas the complete manuscript offers audiences a happy ending of the Chinese dramatic tradition, performance versions closed with the protagonists on the run. Because the performance version was shaped by commercial troupes to cater to popular demand, it can be regarded as a gauge of audience likes and dislikes. By tracing this drama from manuscript to abridged performance versions and to popular selected scenes, it was argued that the opera provided the audiences not only a space of sentimentality but also a stage on which to express pointed social discontent. The author also centers on a series of performance scripts about the “sister-in-law” (Saozi) drama. The plots of sister-in-law operas emanated from the Water Margin (Shuihu zhuan) story cycle, which narrated a quite complicated and eccentric story of an adulterous woman. The original purpose of these dramas was to strengthen a social value by virtue of criticizing the wanton woman, whereas entertainment value succeeded in obscuring the function of didacticism in many of the scripts. The adulterous sex and the violent retribution were highlighted to cater to the wild imaginations of audiences.

In this book, opera is utilized by Goldman as a lens through which to examine urban culture in late Imperial China. Gender, class, and power are critical categories of analysis in exploring state-society relations. Valuable paintings and figures present visual information. The well-selected ditty or edict at the beginning of each chapter magically creates an ancient theatrical atmosphere and leads readers easily into the theme of that chapter. Relying upon careful analysis of many kinds of Chinese opera sources, this scholarship is impeccable. As the “coda,” it will be a significant study for scholars in late Imperial culture, gender study, as well as urban study.

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In ASEAN, Sovereignty, and Intervention in Southeast Asia, Lee Jones explores “when sovereignty is and is not transgressed” (p. 11) and raises doubts and difficult questions on ASEAN’s principle of
noninterference. According to the dominant mind-set to this principle, it is always interpreted as “ASEAN’s success as the leading instantiation of third-world regionalism” (p. 2).

From a context-sensitive perspective, Jones argues that ASEAN’s principle of noninterference has been misunderstood as a consensus among all ASEAN states, for a long time. Both interference and non-interference are relatively dynamic. Though there are differences of opinion regarding the noninterference principle within ASEAN, many scholars (e.g., realists and constructivists) and political elite still consider that ASEAN states have achieved a consensus on the noninterference principle. In fact, the applicability of the principle of noninterference is limited. As Jones demonstrates, some ASEAN member states did intervene in their neighboring countries, contradictory to ASEAN’s principle of noninterference, a fact that has been ignored or downplayed by academics and policymakers to a large extent.

To fill in the gap between the rhetoric and the reality of noninterference, Jones advances a context-sensitive approach to explain the interventions and noninterventions within ASEAN. Jones analyzes the neglected cases of ASEAN states’ interventions in different historical periods, including the cases of Cambodia and East Timor in the Cold War era, the cases of Cambodia and East Timor in the period from the end of the Cold War to the Asian financial crisis, and Myanmar in the post–Cold War era.

As Jones notes, ASEAN states’ interventions are highly selective, and the selectivity is not based on “whether target states are ASEAN members or not” (p. 30). The ASEAN member states, which are tacitly acknowledged as coherent actors, are constrained by internal disagreement (e.g., struggles among powerful social groups and interelite conflicts) and external challenges. In other words, the decision whether to intervene or not intervene is determined by complicated interactions among these factors. In the words of Jones, noninterference is a “technology of power” (p. 226).

In Jones’s opinion, noninterference is not “agential forces standing outside history or above real human subjects” (p. 222). For example, in the Cold War era, the national interests were largely yielded to a singular logic: “the defence of non-communist social order” (p. 212), which was the main motivating factor of ASEAN states’ interventions, such as Indonesia’s intervening in East Timor and ASEAN’s intervening in Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia. In the post–Cold War era, the internal divisions in ASEAN states became
increasingly tense. As a result, ASEAN’s dynamic involvement fluctuated between nonintervention and intervention. In 1997, due to competing interests of state-linked business groups and the new business elites, ASEAN imposed creeping conditionality on Cambodia’s ASEAN membership, which was “far from helping to create political stability in Cambodia, but the exact opposite” (p. 149). Moreover, the intervention in East Timor in the post–Cold War era also clearly indicates ASEAN’s fluctuations between nonintervention and intervention. After the Asian financial crisis, many ASEAN states faced the decline of state-linked business groups, domestic legitimacy crises, and geopolitical shifts, which prompted ASEAN to shift to a new strategy, that is, “promoting political and economic reforms” (p. 209) in the targeted state. ASEAN’s attitude toward Myanmar illustrated this shift.

In summary, noninterference is no longer a catch-all resolution for ASEAN, and many cases of nonintervention analyzed in this book have had destructive consequences; however, there may be less-destructive alternatives to noninterference. As Jones describes, the Aceh Monitoring Mission concentrates its efforts so as to monitor and support a peace process accepted by all the parties to a conflict rather than to simply “impose a settlement on domestic social conflicts” (p. 228). This raises two questions open for discussion: First, how would ASEAN find a proper approach to monitor and support a peace process in a target state (e.g., Myanmar) in the future? Second, would an expansion of ASEAN (e.g., ASEAN Plus Eight) contribute to advancing an alternative option for noninterference? The answers to these questions may be useful to research of nonintervention in ASEAN.

ASEAN, Sovereignty, and Intervention in Southeast Asia develops its own alternative perspective of sovereignty, interference, and noninterference in ASEAN, and disproves the stereotype that ASEAN has been “socialized into a norm of non-interference” (p. 224). Academics, researchers, and students of international relations (especially those interested in sovereignty and noninterference) as well as readers concerned about ASEAN and Southeast Asia studies will benefit from this well-researched book.

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