

# Security Governance and the Politics of State Transformation: Moving From Description to Explanation

Shahar Hameiri <sup>1</sup>, Lee Jones<sup>2</sup>, and Adam Sandor<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup>University of Queensland, <sup>2</sup>Queen Mary University of London, and <sup>3</sup>Käte Hamburger Kolleg Centre for Global Cooperation Research

## Abstract

A rapidly growing, self-identified scholarly subfield on “Security Governance” has recently emerged. Its signal contribution has been to explicate the expansion of security governance beyond traditional defense multilateralism to include diverse actors, networked transnationally across multiple scales. However, this literature is predominantly descriptive and evaluative. Lacking an explanatory theory, it struggles to explain security governance outcomes convincingly. This article advances this body of literature by presenting an explanatory theoretical framework, which sees security governance as being produced through struggles over the appropriate scale of governance and the transformation of state apparatuses, shaped by specific state-society and political economy contexts. This framework is used to explain outcomes in the governance of money laundering and terrorist financing in the Asia-Pacific region and in Africa. Contrary to the expectations of Security Governance scholars that states in these regions generally fail to engage in security governance, the case studies illustrate that significant governance innovation has in fact occurred. This innovation is not the result of supranational multilateralization, but of the transformation and partial internationalization of domestic institutions—to an extent determined by local socio-political struggles over governance rescaling. Our framework thus accounts for real world outcomes; explains, rather than merely describes, the functional efficacy of security governance regimes; and enables normative assessment by identifying the winners and losers that emerge out of governance innovation.

**Keywords:** security governance, state transformation, scale, money laundering

## Introduction

A rapidly growing scholarly subfield on “Security Governance” has recently emerged, predominantly based in Europe.<sup>1</sup> Although other scholars have subsequently discussed the management of security issues from diverse perspectives (e.g. [Abrahamsen and Williams 2011](#); [Avant](#)

[and Westerwinter 2016b](#)), this community was the first to identify that international security was being “governed” and has developed a substantial body of literature over the past fifteen years. Its primary insight is the observation that bureaucratic, networked, and multilevel governance systems, originally identified with respect to non-security issues, have extended into the domain of security, particularly in Western Europe and the transatlantic region ([Krahmann 2003](#); [Webber et al. 2004](#); [Bevir and Hall 2014](#)). This is a significant insight, since

1 Herein, the capitalized “Security Governance” refers to the body of literature; “security governance” to the empirical phenomenon.

mainstream security scholarship has largely remained blind to the existence of “governance” in security matters, instead focusing primarily on “US hegemony... its stability, the rise of new powers, and the intransigence of various rogue states” (Avant and Westerwinter 2016a: 1). Even scholars who recognize the broadening of the security agenda to non-state threats usually assume that governments respond with “exceptional measures” akin to war (Buzan et al. 1998). Conversely, Security Governance scholars argue, new modes of security governance are emerging, characterized by: heterarchy; the involvement of diverse public and private actors, whose interaction is structured by norms and tacit understandings as well as formal rules; formal and informal institutions; and collective purposes (Webber et al. 2004, 8). They have thereby sought to shift security debates towards asking “how the fragmentation of power and authority affects the making and implementation of security policy in a broader sense” (Krahmann 2003, 21).

Subsequently, however, even proponents have observed that Security Governance has become “stuck,” bogged down in debates over the definition of security governance or the relative efficacy of particular governance arrangements (Sperling and Webber 2014; Ehrhart, Hegemann, and Kahl 2014a). Its influence on the wider field of security studies is also extremely limited (Christou et al. 2010). Even scholars studying the same empirical phenomenon—particularly those based in North America—have largely ignored the existing subfield.<sup>2</sup> We argue that Security Governance is failing to reach its potential due to its theoretical underdevelopment, specifically its inability to explain the emergence and operation of security governance regimes. Given the significance of the empirical phenomena that Security Governance foregrounds, it is imperative for security scholars to overcome its limitations. Our aim is thus to elaborate a framework for explaining the emergence, form, and outputs of security governance arrangements.

We begin by identifying Security Governance’s weaknesses. Specifically, its origins in neo-functional

European integration studies lead Security Governance to make two key mistakes that prevent the development of an explanatory framework. First, scholars equate the dominant form that security governance assumes in Europe and the North Atlantic—sovereignty-pooling within multilateral organizations (e.g. the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)) with security governance *in general*. As we show below, this blinds existing scholarship to the existence of important modes of security governance in other parts of the world, and those European forms of governance that are institutionally distinct, but nevertheless involve the dispersion of security policymaking and implementation. Consequently, rather than explaining security governance regimes’ diversity and outputs, Security Governance scholars limit themselves to identifying variations of security governance that approximate EU/NATO. When they fail to find any, they erroneously conclude via a circular logic that security governance is a largely European phenomenon.

Second, Security Governance understands the development of security governance in Europe as governments’ functional response to “wicked problems”—transboundary threats, such as climate change, organized crime, and terrorism that states cannot manage individually. This leads them to pool sovereignty. Security Governance scholars are thus puzzled when non-Western policymakers do not construct EU-like institutions, despite facing similar challenges. They explain this by contrasting European states’ “post-Westphalian” willingness to pool sovereignty with non-European states’ “Westphalian” reluctance to do so (Wagnsson et al. 2009; Kirchner and Domínguez 2011a), an argument that is theoretically limited and empirically questionable. Even within Europe, the degree to which sovereignty is pooled and security “governed” varies considerably across issue-areas. Moreover, opposition to doing so is inconsistent outside Europe. Security Governance cannot explain this variation in security governance’s form and outputs, which is irreducible to regional differences or crude generalizations about the degree of “Westphalianism.”

Our framework aims to overcome these weaknesses. We reject Security Governance’s presentation as a functionalist response to new, transboundary challenges. Indeed, we concur with critical security studies’ longstanding view that security’s meaning is inherently contested as it promotes different social and political agendas (McDonald 2008). What the field often ignores, however, is that conflicts over security’s meaning are bound up in deeper struggles over how to *govern* security problems (Hameiri and Jones 2015). The claim that individual states cannot handle security problems and must

2 For example, Avant and Westerwinter (2016a), despite studying “transnational security governance”, do not even recognise the subfield’s existence, depicting their subject as previously unstudied and citing predominantly North American scholarship on “governance” more generally, or on the role of non-governmental and private actors in security politics. The entire collection does not cite the scholars who initiated and developed the Security Governance subfield, like Bevir, Kirchner, Krahmann, Sperling and Webber (Avant and Westerwinter 2016b).

therefore cooperate and disperse authority is actually a highly political, and contested demand to reconfigure power, resources, and political opportunity structures. New modes of security governance are outcomes of this contestation, which also shapes the operation of security governance regimes.

We view this as a struggle over the appropriate scale at which a security issue should be governed, and the instruments and actors that should govern it. This does not necessarily involve efforts to transfer authority to supranational bodies. More often, it involves attempts to construct governance spaces that better map onto a threat's perceived transboundary scope. However, different governance scales manifest different configurations of power, resources, and political opportunities that privilege some actors, interests, and ideologies over others. Consequently, while some socio-political coalitions may promote changes in particular issues' governance scale, others will resist such change. Supporters often pursue governance rescaling not through multilateralization, but by transforming domestic state apparatuses to link them with other agencies in transnational, multilevel, networked governance arrangements so that they work to impose international priorities and regulations upon other parts of their states and societies (Hameiri and Jones 2015). But since state institutions distribute power and resources, socio-political coalitions whose struggles are conditioned by broader power relations shaped by the political economy contest their reconfiguration. Thus, we explain variation in security governance regimes' form and operation as a reflection of the contestation over state transformation that permeates attempts to rescale governance of particular security issues. This contestation continues even after governance is transformed, as powerful groups seek to mold the operations of reworked institutions to suit their interests.

We demonstrate our framework's utility through a comparison of efforts to tackle money laundering and terrorist financing in Vanuatu and Senegal. Focusing on a particular regime and its operation in particular places—rather than attempting a more abstract or generalized argument—is critical to elucidate the contested dynamics of state transformation that we present as the heart of the politics of security governance. We focus on the global Anti-Money Laundering/Countering the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) regime because its near-universal adoption clearly shows that “post-Westphalian” European states are not the only ones hospitable to security governance innovations. We selected Vanuatu and Senegal because they are quite different: one is a small Pacific Island tax haven with an established Offshore Financial Center (OFC); the other a larger West African

state with a relatively small, domestically oriented commercial banking sector that nevertheless performs financial activities for some countries within its sub-region. Both, however, are important players in their respective regions, receiving considerable international resources to transform AML/CFT governance in line with Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Recommendations. These efforts have led to substantial domestic governance changes.

Our analysis shows that struggles over state transformation and the operation of rescaled institutions rooted in domestic political economy contexts have conditioned the functioning of regimes. In Vanuatu, the AML/CFT regime's efficacy has been constrained by the OFC's power, which has negated law enforcement functions. In Senegal, on the other hand, the influence of “big men” has significantly shaped the regime, constraining its focus to targeting weak players who use the formal banking sector. As a result, powerful individuals and non-banking institutions are left untouched. Thus, these different cases show that Security Governance's assumptions about the limited spread of security governance are mistaken, and that struggles over rescaling have shaped its evolution in each country.

## Security Governance and Its Limitations

Security Governance has contributed significantly to international relations scholarship by demonstrating that security policy and provision no longer fall exclusively in the domain of traditional national security actors. Studies of the EU and NATO clearly show that a far wider range of governmental, quasi-governmental, and non-governmental actors are now involved, encompassing, among others, ministries of finance and agriculture, regulatory bodies, civil society actors, and private companies (Krahmann 2003; Webber et al. 2004). The multilevel, networked governance regimes developed in Europe to manage issues from pollution standards to labor regulation have gradually been extended to security concerns like transnational crime, terrorism, and irregular migration (Kaunert 2011). These frequently bureaucratic, technical systems also extend to the EU's near-abroad through various “neighborhood” and “partnership” schemes (Wolff et al. 2009).

Security Governance scholars' explanation of these developments is overwhelmingly functional, reflecting the influence of neo-functional European integration theories. Globalization, they argue, has exacerbated problematic transboundary flows and reduced states' capacity to manage them. This has required new forms of cooperation (Bevir and Hall 2014, 17–26;

Kirchner 2007, 7–8; Kirchner and Domínguez 2011a, 1). The challenge is not confined to the security domain. Central governments' dwindling capacity to manage "wicked problems" already generated a "crisis in the bureaucratic state" in the 1970s, making policymakers realize that the state "had to pursue coordination and regulation across borders" (Bevir and Hall 2014, 23). This generated extensive public sector restructuring, notably the replacement of hierarchical command-and-control systems with networked approaches encompassing diverse public and private actors: the widely observed shift from government to governance. In Europe particularly, these arrangements became transnationally networked, generating new, multilevel, functionalist governance regimes (Hooghe and Marks 2001). Security governance in Europe and the wider trans-Atlantic region is a logical extension of this approach to manage common security problems (see Wagnsson et al. 2009).

Because Security Governance scholars see security governance as a natural outgrowth of Europe's functional regional integration, they grasp it not as a puzzle demanding explanation, but as an empirical phenomenon requiring explication. Consequently, their treatment of new modes of governance has been overwhelmingly descriptive. As two leading proponents state, Security Governance "is not... theoretically innovative... its articulation has not... entailed laying any notable theoretical ground work;" indeed, it is caught in a "trap of 'pre-theory'" (Sperling and Webber 2014, 128–129; also Christou et al. 2010, 342). Security Governance is merely a "heuristic device" to help identify and describe departures from traditional security policies (Kirchner and Sperling 2007, 18). Consequently, much debate within this literature revolves around what "counts" as security governance (Adler and Greve 2009; Kirchner and Domínguez 2011a; Breslin and Croft 2012; Sperling and Webber 2014). A second debate concerns the technical or normative evaluation of security governance regimes, with growing attention to their unintended consequences (Daase and Friesendorf 2010). Ehrhart et al. (2014b) rightly criticize this predominantly technical and apolitical exercise and demand more critical assessments, although this does not move Security Governance closer to explanatory theory. Accordingly, even Security Governance proponents now agree it urgently requires further development (Christou et al. 2010; Sperling and Webber 2014; Ehrhart et al. 2014a).

Security Governance scholars' inability to explain variation in security governance regimes and their outcomes stems in part from their implicit assumption that security governance must resemble EU-style "regional multilateralism" (Kirchner and Domínguez 2011b, 16).

Accordingly, they typically compare NATO/EU institutions to other regional security organizations (RSOs). Finding that the latter lack the former's deep integration and multilateral/supranational governance arrangements, they either conclude that security governance is weak or absent in other regions, or that the concept is stretched beyond recognition to fit EU-style multilateralization (Kirchner and Sperling 2007; Kirchner and Domínguez 2011a; Breslin and Croft 2012). Yet the lack of security governance in regions outside the EU is naturally puzzling for functionalists. Globalization is assumed to have weakened all states and generated new threats worldwide; why do non-European policymakers not also empower their RSOs to engage in security governance?

Given its theoretical paucity, Security Governance's answers to this question are admittedly the result of a "pre-theoretical, functional aggregation[s] of factors" (Christou et al. 2010, 344). Notably, scholars have ascribed degrees of security multilateralism to a multitude of factors: the nature of institutions (Kirchner 2007, 11); levels of economic freedom, development, government efficacy, corruption, the rule of law, and political rights (Kirchner and Domínguez 2014); and domestic convergence in capacities, political systems and institutional longevity (Dorussen and Kirchner 2014). Sperling and Webber (2014) finesse these factors into the dominant explanation of whether security governance will be "nascent," "ascendant," or "mature" in a given region, thus ascribing "degree[s] of 'post-Westphalianism.'" Shared threat perceptions, the nature of external threat, and whether local states wield Westphalian "sovereign control" or are "penetrated" by non-state actors all determine levels of post-Westphalianism (Kirchner and Sperling 2010). The literature thus distinguishes between zones of "post-Westphalian" states and the rest of the world, arguing that, while "'post-Westphalian' security cultures" facilitate security governance, "'Westphalian' security cultures intensify the problem of collective action in the provision of security" (Kirchner and Sperling 2010, 13; also Sperling and Webber 2014, 134). Specifically, non-European "Westphalian states... are trapped by the logic of anarchy"; they are unable or unwilling to relinquish resources and sovereign authority to RSOs, generating "'weaker' forms of regional security collaboration" (Kirchner 2007, 11), and "a patchwork of institutionalization" (Kirchner and Domínguez 2011b, 14). The EU thus becomes virtually *sui generis* "in a Westphalian world" (Wagnsson et al. 2009).

This approach has two problems. First, the unacknowledged drift away from security *governance* to security *multilateralism* obfuscates categories, and blinds

scholars to the emergence of security governance beyond formal multilateral organizations, even within Europe. Although many forms of European security governance have clearly emerged alongside the EU's institutionalization, it is not necessary for security governance to exactly resemble EU variants in order to be present. This leads to the erroneous conclusion that the absence of EU-style supranationalism denotes the absence of security governance. Indeed, today's transboundary threats and risks require security governance and also generate responses that transcend the established political borders of states and RSOs alike, both of which are scaled to match the scope of a specific threat.

For example, the EU's Cocaine Route Program is an interlinked chain of projects aimed at transforming domestic governance in the territories through which cocaine is smuggled into Europe—Latin America and West Africa—so as to disrupt this illicit flow (Sandor 2016a). This security governance arrangement does not map onto, and would never be captured by, studies of European, African, or Latin American RSOs. Similarly, as we show below, AML/CFT efforts occur through functional regional groupings that are established to enact FATF disciplines, whose memberships also do not align with RSOs. When functionalist Security Governance scholars overlook the emergence of such functionally specific modes of governance, they underscore their problematic fixation on RSOs and the limits of comparative regionalism. Our approach, outlined below, allows us to recognize and explain diversity across security governance regimes, whether these emerge through multilateralization or other processes. This allows for better comparisons of security governance regimes globally.

A second problem concerns the crude distinction between “post-Westphalian” and other forms of statehood that explain divergences in regional security governance. First, the explanation is circular: since Security Governance scholars define security governance as resembling the particular dominant form it assumes in Europe—sovereignty-pooling in the EU/NATO—it is unsurprising that these scholars find it more often in Europe. More importantly, the distinction elides considerable diversity in governance outcomes *within* regions or even single countries. Even within the EU, not every security issue is managed through sovereignty-pooling. The EU's supposedly “post-Westphalian” member-states frequently play “sovereignty games,” strategically relaxing or flexing their legal sovereignty to promote or resist transnational European governance initiatives to advance domestic interests (Adler-Nissen and Gammeltoft-Hansen 2008). Consider, for example, Europe's migrant crisis, wherein the restoration of hard

borders—barbed wire, armed guards, and human rights abuses—has occurred unevenly alongside transnational management efforts.

Moreover, non-European states do not uniformly reject security governance. Even in the Asia-Pacific region, home to the world's most sovereignty-jealous states unable to develop anything beyond “weak [security] governance” (Kirchner 2007, 11–12), considerable internal transformations along “post-Westphalian” lines are occurring (Dubash and Morgan 2013). States in the region do not rigidly adhere to sovereignty. Instead, it is “graduated,” flexed, and relaxed strategically, as in Europe (Ong 2000; Jones 2012). There is thus ample evidence that “non-traditional” modes of security governance are emerging outside the EU (Hameiri and Jones 2015). Similarly, Security Governance studies of Africa concede that states like Rwanda have at times contributed to regional security governance and at others undermined it, sometimes simultaneously (Jackson 2012). This unevenness undermines explanations for Africa's “weak” security governance based on African statehood's generalized attributes—scarce resources and a reluctance to cede their already fragile sovereignty to RSOs (e.g. Babarinde 2011, 294–297). The obvious question is therefore: why are states willing to generate resources and state capacities and relax their sovereignty on certain issues but not others? Since Security Governance fails to address this question, it cannot explain variation in the emergence of security governance regimes, nor how they operate in practice.

### State Transformation and Security Governance: Towards a Theoretical Framework

This section develops a theoretical framework designed to explain how security governance regimes emerge and operate. First, we move beyond the Security Governance subfield to consider other contributions to security studies, some of which help move us in the right direction, but all of which have their own limitations. Second, we delineate our framework, which conceptualizes the emergence and operation of security governance regimes as involving the contested transformation of state apparatuses.

#### Theorizing security governance: existing approaches

The shortcomings of Security Governance reflect, in part, the subfield's neglect of wider theoretical developments in security studies (Christou et al. 2010). This may reflect the general neglect of governance among

mainstream security scholars. Mainstream realists, for instance, have typically accepted [Jervis's \(1982\)](#) assertion that regimes are hard to create in the “high politics” domain of security. Constructivists have been more interested in how norms influence security practices (e.g. [Tannenwald 2007](#)), but have rarely been interested in governance per se. Indeed, the influential Copenhagen School of security studies practically ignores the issue, implicitly viewing security governance as a natural outgrowth of a successful securitizing “speech act” (e.g. [Wæver 2011](#)). Its assumption that securitization leads to exceptional measures that break with “politics as usual” does not resonate with the empirical phenomena Security Governance scholars examine.

However, the “Paris School” of security studies, drawing on Foucault and Bourdieu, does attend to the governance of security, making its neglect by Security Governance scholars unfortunate. Scholars following Foucault define security as a “technique of government,” whereby governance outcomes reflect contests between security professionals whose “practices, audiences and contexts... enable or constrain the production of specific forms of governmentality” ([CASE Collective 2006](#), 457). Those following Bourdieu add that actors and practices in the security “field” have gradually subordinated discrete fields of governance. Thus, [Bigo \(2001\)](#) and others foreground the practices of various “managers of unease,” including state police and military actors, consultants, and other security experts, who identify security risks, possible future scenarios, and appropriate governance responses to advance their preferred techniques to govern undesirable or risk-laden elements (also see [Huysmans 2006](#)).

As such, the broadening of the security field is best understood as increasingly transnational, and as combining an array of public and private actors ([Bigo 2013](#); see also [Avant and Haufler 2018](#)). Indeed, a growing literature on security privatization has expanded an earlier focus on “securocrats” by examining the governance role of private security actors, and how it shapes the state security provision (see [Abrahamsen and Williams 2011](#); [Liss and Sharman 2015](#); [Bures and Carrapico 2017](#)). Private companies are often not only implementers of state agendas, but become important actors shaping how security threats are understood and governed (see [Amicelle and Favarel-Garrigues 2012](#)).

These approaches helpfully move us beyond a focus on RSOs, but also suffer from some limitations. First, Foucauldian approaches lack adequate analytical tools to explain security professionals’ widely divergent “productive capacities” across different issue-areas and socio-political contexts. By focusing narrowly on “securocrats”

and contending “governmentalities” (e.g. [Larner and Walters 2004](#); [Methmann and Oels 2015](#)), they neglect the wider socio-political power relations and struggles that constrain and enable security professionals’ agency. As our case studies show, struggles *external* to the security field significantly shape the institutional form and practical operation of security governance. Political economy dynamics are particularly crucial, but are neglected by poststructuralists, and indeed many other security scholars.

Bourdiesian approaches do at least acknowledge that the security field is shaped by connected, adjacent fields and the competitive or cooperative practices of global and local, public and private actors ([Abrahamsen and Williams 2011](#); [Sandor 2016a](#)). However, even this conceptualization is not entirely convincing. Our case study shows that diverse actors are involved in shaping security governance outcomes and it is doubtful whether they are all part of a single or even adjacent/connected fields. As some Bourdiesians have admitted, operationalizing the “field” concept in transnational or global settings is very difficult ([Acuto and Curtis 2014](#): 27).

A final, more recent approach involves the deployment of network theory (e.g. [Avant and Westerwinter 2016b](#)). Bypassing the aforementioned scholarship, this approach instead takes inspiration from literature showing how states, international organizations and private actors have jointly developed governance arrangements for economic issues (e.g. [Abbott and Snidal 2009](#)). Applied to security, this involves studying how such actors form “networks” to manage issues as diverse as non-proliferation ([Eilstrup-Sangiovanni 2016](#)), piracy ([Percy 2016](#)), or private military companies ([Avant 2016](#)). Like the Paris School, this approach usefully moves beyond Security Governance’s narrow fixation on RSOs, highlighting the various formal and informal mechanisms that have been developed to govern different security issues. However, the network approach also has significant drawbacks. First, the “network” concept is excessively broad. As [Avant and Westerwinter \(2016a: 6\)](#) admit, “any organizational form can be represented and examined as a network”. As a loose, catch-all concept, “network” lacks the detailed conceptual apparatus to capture what we see as the central aspect of contemporary security governance: the transformation of states. Second, it is unclear that the factors foregrounded by network theory—the position of actors, and the distribution and quality of ties—can actually explain the form and operation of governance regimes. These variables do not seem to be associated with whether regimes are effective or not, or benefit broad or narrow concerns, for example (see [Avant and Westerwinter 2016a: 15](#)). Third,

while useful in describing the emergence and pattern of particular regimes at the “global” or “transnational” level, network approaches are weaker at examining how these regimes actually operate on the ground, because they neglect political contestation, or even see network governance as a means of evading contestation altogether (e.g. [Eilstrup-Sangiovanni 2016](#)). Conversely, we see security governance as being contested throughout, from formation through implementation.

### Theorizing security governance as state transformation

Our own approach involves three steps. First, we theorize efforts to create transnational security governance regimes as attempts to change the *scale* at which an issue is managed. Although the claim that “new” threats are transboundary and cannot be managed by individual states is widely accepted as common sense, it is actually a demand for a significant reallocation of power and authority—a process we call “rescaling.” “Scale” refers to hierarchical social, political, and economic territorial spaces, each denoting “the arena and moment, both discursively and materially, where socio-spatial power relations are contested and compromises are negotiated and regulated” ([Swyngedouw 1997](#), 140). Each territorial space exists within a hierarchical relationship with other territorial spaces, in which social, political and economic relations are organized and contested. Scales can be a state’s existing administrative tiers, but they can also transcend or cut across tiers, manifesting themselves as “eco-systems” or “local communities.”

As political geographers have noted, the scale at which any issue is governed is not neutral, because different scales involve different configurations of actors, resources, and political opportunity structures ([Harvey 2006](#)). For example, shifting an issue from the subnational to the national level vastly expands the number of actors involved, changing the balance of interests, ideologies, and power among them, thereby altering political outcomes (see [Gibson 2012](#)). Accordingly, while some actors may promote shifts in security governance beyond the national scale, others, for whom such a change would be detrimental, may resist it. Hence, security governance is not the functional, apolitical outgrowth of complex interdependence, but a “rescaling” project that is inherently political and contested between coalitions of socio-political forces favoring different scalar arrangements.

Rescaling security governance—constructing new scales of governance and assigning them authority—is therefore a creative and fraught political process. This is perhaps especially true with respect to security, where

defining the nature and scope of threats, and the best scale at which to govern them, are inherently open-ended and contested processes. Analyzing security governance thus begins by identifying the issue-specific scale of governance that different coalitions of social and political forces promote. This typically involves contending claims about the threat’s scope and the level, instruments, and actors most appropriate for governing a particular security issue. These claims are not limited to existing governance scales, such as national governments or regional organizations; instead, coalitions may promote new, functionally specific governance spaces, as the FATF case suggests.

Our second theoretical claim is that this scalar contestation predominantly takes the form of a political struggle over the transformation of state apparatuses. It is now widely assumed that states cannot tackle many major security threats alone, particularly “non-traditional” issues that easily cross state boundaries. Those accepting this view may push for the rescaling of governance away from “Westphalian” states to supranational bodies, while others resist, as Security Governance scholars suppose. However, empowering supranational bodies to manage security is exceedingly difficult and, we contend, this is not the primary focus of struggles over transnational governance today. Nor are many securocrats satisfied with simply creating loose “network” arrangements, which often lack the substantial monitoring and enforcement capabilities associated with states (cf. [Abbott and Snidal 2009](#)).

Rather than supplanting states or relying on traditional “cooperation”, a major focus of efforts to construct transnational governance regimes is instead to transform the form, function, and operation of state apparatuses so that they become more effective in tackling security threats. This often involves the creation of international standards, regulations, best practices, and so on, which governments must internalize into their domestic governance systems. Parts of their states thereby become “internationalized”, their primary goal being the imposition of international discipline on other parts of their states and societies. In weaker states, donor intervention may seek to build the requisite institutions and capacities to enforce these disciplines, reflecting the wider merging of development and security ([Duffield 2001](#)). These transformed institutions are also often networked internationally with peers and/or relevant international regulatory agencies. Hence, security governance regimes reflect and further propel the disaggregation of state apparatuses as part of the widespread shift from top-down government to more diffuse forms of regulatory statehood. This has introduced latitude for national/subnational agencies to pursue unconventional

arrangements, including direct interactions with private actors and across borders (Jayasuriya 2001). As such, many forms of security governance also elide conventional distinctions between domestic and international, public and private.

Crucially, however, state transformation processes are highly contested since, just as scales are never neutral, nor are state institutions. State apparatuses always exhibit “strategic selectivity:” they are organized to systematically favor certain interests, agendas, and strategies (Jessop 2008). Their structures reflect repeated struggles among socio-political forces to reorganize state institutions in their favor, and marginalize adversaries. Precisely because state institutions reflect and entrench particular societal distributions of power and resources, those who stand to lose out will resist any attempts to reconfigure them. Accordingly, whether security governance can be successfully rescaled through the transformation of state apparatuses will depend on the balance of forces contesting such projects and their strategies. Crucially, this struggle does not end when institutions are redesigned, but continues as forces opposed to change try to reverse the transformation or undermine the operation of rescaled state apparatuses.

Third and finally, we understand the scalar politics of state transformation to be underpinned by struggles for power and resources between different coalitions of socio-political forces, rooted in particular social power and political economy contexts. These forces go well beyond the narrow networks of security professionals emphasized by Foucauldian and Bourdieusian approaches. They may include groups beyond a state’s borders, like donors, international institutions, and overseas government agencies, which often initiate transboundary securitization processes and forge alliances with like-minded local groups. Local forces may include ethnic, religious and ideological groupings, social classes and class fractions, and their political representatives in political parties, state institutions, and wider civil society. Following Jessop (2008), struggles among such coalitions animate politics and result in the capture, transformation, or maintenance of state power.

These coalitions, and the power relations between them, will in turn be shaped by wider structural forces, particularly broader patterns of social and economic power, their legacy in shaping access to institutions and resources, and the political economy dynamics of specific issue areas. As many scholars and policymakers suggest, the “new” threats and risks that security governance is designed to address comprise the “dark side of globalization” (Group of Eight 1999; Mittelman 2010). They emerge as negative externalities of intensifying capitalist

development and the associated creation of transnational infrastructures. Accordingly, any effort to tackle these challenges will frequently affect business activities. For example, efforts to combat money laundering will naturally engage the financial sector, as our cases show; suppressing transboundary environmental threats involves tackling polluting industries; and managing pandemic diseases originating in livestock will necessarily touch upon agricultural interests. Contemporary security governance also frequently involves private sector actors as policymakers, implementers, and assessors, all of whom have vested interests in securitization. Hence, business actors will likely join the coalitions contesting security governance, seeking arrangements that protect or advance their interests. The relative weight of a particular sector, its relationship with other social forces, and its access to state power is likely to carry significant weight in the evolution and outputs of security governance.

### **Case Study: Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing in the Asia-Pacific and Africa**

We now apply our analytical framework to a case study of anti-money-laundering and terrorist financing (AML/CFT). We first describe the global governance regime that has been constructed in this area, centered on the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). This regime clearly goes beyond conventional security politics to comprise a complex governance arrangement, conforming to the expectation of Security Governance and other scholars. However, contrary to their expectations, it does not operate by empowering multilateral organizations or merely creating a network between different actors. Rather, the global AML/CFT regime seeks to transform state apparatuses so that they enact global disciplines on domestic societies. Consistent with our framework, we show that this attempt to rescale governance and transform states is inherently contested, and that socio-political conflict ultimately determines the extent and form of AML/CFT governance on the ground.

#### **The security governance of money laundering and terrorist financing**

In recent decades, money laundering and terrorist financing have become major international security issues. Money laundering was first outlawed by the US in 1986 as part of its so-called war on drugs, and subsequently became a major aspect of efforts to tackle transnational organized crime on the basis that preventing the recycling of criminal proceeds would reduce incentives to



commit precursor crimes. Since 9/11, terrorist financing has been added to the anti-money-laundering agenda. Reflecting Security Governance observations, powerful governments have argued that these threats' transnational nature renders individual states incapable of addressing them unilaterally, leading to the construction of a new mode of security governance that spans borders and the public and private sectors. However, contrary to Security Governance expectations, AML/CFT governance does not occur through established RSOs. Instead, the 36-member FATF has elaborated a global set of 40 recommendations that stipulate how domestic state governance must be transformed to manage this issue. This has fostered the creation of transnational, multilevel networks of financial regulators (FATF 2012). Compliance is monitored through functional, pan-regional bodies organizing mutual peer reviews, and is indirectly enforced through private sector responses to these evaluations (Sharman 2011). Remarkably, FATF's Recommendations have been adopted by every country and self-governing jurisdiction except Iran and North Korea, defying Security Governance's view of non-European, "Westphalian" states rejecting security governance on grounds of sovereignty or inadequate resources.

The voluntary widespread adoption of FATF Recommendations contrasts with the lackluster reception of other international financial regulatory efforts, including the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) campaign against tax havens and the Financial Stability Board's efforts to curb financial sector excesses. This has been attributed to the "securitization" of money laundering and terrorist financing, especially after 9/11, which raised the costs of non-compliance for recalcitrant jurisdictions. Furthermore, new legislation in powerful states, such as the US PATRIOT Act, has meant that jurisdictions refusing to cooperate with FATF could face being completely cut off from the world's main financial markets. This has significantly raised the stakes of non-compliance (Sharman 2009).

Despite near-universal participation, however, the outputs of this mode of governance are frequently disappointing, underscoring the need to go beyond merely specifying networked governance arrangements at the global level to understand how security governance actually operates in practice. According to the *International Monetary Fund* (2011, 8), "full compliance" is "rare," with "partial compliance" occurring in only 25 percent of cases. Experimental studies show that violating FATF rules is easy, particularly in Western states (Sharman 2011; Findley et al. 2014). This contradicts another assumption in the Security Governance literature: that the West's "post-Westphalian" states are most strongly en-

gaged in new forms of security governance. This "compliance gap" between the formal adoption of FATF regulations and actual implementation clearly demands an explanation. Deploying our framework, we now show how the global AML/CFT regime is an instance of governing security through state transformation, before demonstrating how the contestation of this process shapes governance outcomes.

### *The AML/CFT regime as state transformation*

FATF's AML/CFT regime is not simply a multilateral organization, nor is it a generic "network" of actors; it operates by promoting the transformation of state apparatuses in member-countries, internationalizing them with the expectation that they will impose global disciplines on other parts of their states and societies. The centerpiece of this regime is FATF's "40 Recommendations", which provide a detailed template of laws, institutions, and procedures that seek to transform domestic regulatory arrangements, network them across state borders, and harmonize their practices (see Figure 1). The Recommendations first specify the processes that private-sector actors must use to detect, prevent, and report suspected illicit transactions. After criminalizing money laundering and terrorist financing, states must establish Financial Intelligence Units (FIU) to monitor private-sector compliance, receive and investigate "suspicious transaction reports" (STR), coordinate the responses of other government agencies, and network with their international counterparts. FATF also prescribes how law-enforcement and judicial apparatuses should suppress money laundering and terrorist financing, demanding the confiscation of illicit assets.

Crucially, however, FATF does not impose or enforce these Recommendations directly. Instead, nine FATF-Style Regional Bodies (FSRBs) have been established, which network FIUs in geographical domains, coordinate mutual peer reviews to monitor compliance, and refine FATF's Recommendations based on regional specificities. As noted, these FSRBs cut across established RSOs; the US, is a member of every FSRB. The IMF and World Bank also monitor implementation as part of their general surveillance of developing countries. FIUs have their own global network, the Egmont Group, which encourages compliance through information sharing and capacity-building. Finally, because private financial institutions informally use FATF evaluations as proxy indicators for investment risk in particular territories, poor ratings or blacklisting risk excluding non-compliant states from global capital markets, thus creating an additional indirect enforcement mechanism (Sharman 2011).




Figure 1. FATF’s AML-CFT Security Governance Regime

As our framework suggests, the FATF regime has been promoted by an identifiable socio-political coalition. Key actors include financial regulators in powerful OECD states, who designed and promoted FATF’s Recommendations; international technocrats within the IMF and World Bank, which incorporate compliance checks and relevant capacity-building into their programs; Northern donor agencies, which have also sought to transform Southern states to comply with the Recommendations; and leading international banks, clustered in the Wolfsberg Group, which have elaborated additional voluntary standards for their industry (see [Sharman 2011](#)). Together, these entities have usually found some allies in recipient societies, but their nature and relative power varies considerably across jurisdictions. The pro-FATF coalition has often met stiff resistance from powerful forces in recipient states, shaping the contours of governance rescaling and the operation of this security governance regime on the ground, as our country cases will now show.

**Country cases: contested security governance in Vanuatu and Senegal**

This section explores how contestation shapes the outcome of security governance rescaling in two coun-

tries: Vanuatu and Senegal. These cases were chosen to demonstrate the framework’s explanatory power across apparently dissimilar cases: one is a small Pacific Island tax haven with an established OFC, the other, a much larger West African state with a relatively small, domestically oriented commercial banking sector that nevertheless performs financial activities for some countries within its sub-region. However, both countries have been subjected to significant external pressure (including FATF blacklisting) and capacity-building assistance. Superficially, despite the differences between these states, the outcomes of this external pressure appear very similar: although the FATF regime was ostensibly implemented, it failed to tackle money laundering and terrorist financing. However, contrary to Security Governance scholars’ assumptions, this was not a result of a “Westphalian” refusal of transboundary cooperation, nor of insufficient “capacity”, since both states received extensive capacity-building assistance, which did lead to substantial reconfigurations of domestic governance. The disappointing outcomes of this transformation instead reflect local power relations and socio-political conflict in each country.

We structure the case studies as follows. First, we show that governance rescaling efforts led to state transformation. Second, we briefly describe the wider political

economy context in each country, identifying the dominant societal groups and their relations to state power. Third, we closely analyze these groups' responses to the AML/CFT regime, tracing their struggles to the eventual governance outcome.

### *Vanuatu*

The small Pacific Island state of Vanuatu came under pressure from FATF and other members of the AML/CFT coalition, notably Australian financial regulators, as part of a general assault on OFCs (aka "tax havens") in the Pacific from the late 1990s. The Pacific Islands are home to many OFCs, established—often by former colonial powers—to foster economic development in otherwise impoverished, small, and resource-scarce countries. Some of these states have been subject to FATF blacklisting, prompting them to adopt FATF's mode of security governance and admit extensive international capacity-building assistance to transform and rescale their domestic governance systems. In some instances, the impact has been significant. In the most dramatic case, Nauru, a tiny country of 11,000 people, attracted much of the US \$100 billion laundered out of Russia following its 1998 financial crisis. FATF's 2000 blacklisting of Nauru precipitated the collapse of its entire financial sector, leaving it dependent on hard currency shipments from Australia.

Chastened by Nauru's experience, Vanuatu adopted FATF's Recommendations in 2000, transforming its domestic governance along the lines described above and undergoing three peer reviews by the Asia-Pacific Group (APG), the regional FSRB by 2015. However, although FATF-compliant laws, regulations, and agencies are in place, the system is wholly ineffectual at pursuing money launderers, as noted in the latest APG review, prompting Vanuatu's inclusion on FATF's high-risk jurisdictions list. Furthermore, despite considerably reducing OFC deposits, AML/CFT measures have apparently largely displaced money laundering out of Vanuatu or into real estate, rather than eradicating it. Although precise data are unavailable, a [Vanuatu FIU \(2009\)](#) annual report highlights the rapid growth in real estate agencies and land sales from 2000–2006. The report notes: "there is a high possibility of criminals and launders [*sic*] utilizing the real estate market to launder their funds or purchase property/lands as legitimate assets" ([Vanuatu FIU 2009](#), 6). As we show, these outcomes are largely due to the tight linkages between OFC and government elites, which have seriously constrained the efficiency of rescaled AML/CFT apparatuses.

Formal compliance with FATF strictures, though initially weak, is now more robust, with significant evidence of security governance rescaling and state transfor-

mation. The main agencies regulating Vanuatu's OFC—the FIU, the Reserve Bank (RBV), the Financial Services Commission (VFSC), the Police Force, and the Department of Public Prosecutions (DPP)—are now integrated into a transnational regulatory regime. The FIU has joined the Egmont Group and receives capacity-building assistance from the Pacific Islands Forum and Australia's FIU, AUSTRAC. The RBV's regulatory arm receives ongoing IMF support, and the VFSC's new supervision unit is networked with regional and global agencies, in addition to the FIU and RBV. Financial institutions are now submitting suspicious transaction reports to the FIU, which directs the Police's new Transnational Crime Unit (TCU) to investigate. This unit is specially co-funded by the Vanuatu and Australian governments, is networked with regional counterparts and, until 2012, was regularly co-staffed by Australian officers. The unit then passes evidence to the DPP, which is responsible for prosecutions.

These institutional changes stemmed from the formation of a solid coalition of powerful political, bureaucratic, and economic actors that supported security governance rescaling, creating the basis for a tactical alliance with the international forces promoting FATF's regime. What united these domestic actors was the need to comply with external demands in order to avoid Nauru's fate. Vanuatu's financial regulators and bankers generally recognized the need to defend the territory's reputation to save its OFC.<sup>3</sup> This generated substantial support for Australian-led interventions to transform Vanuatu's state apparatuses and integrate them into transnational regulatory networks. Yet, far from salvaging the OFC, widespread capital flight ensued, with OFC deposits shrinking from US\$1.4bn to just US\$100m from 2004–2010 ([van Fossen 2012](#), 54–5). These costly changes clearly vitiate Security Governance assumptions that non-European states simply cling to "Westphalian" sovereignty. The extensive aid and capacity-building assistance targeting Vanuatu also shows that Southern states' inability or unwillingness to

- 3 Bayer, Tom M. Chairman, Pacific International Trust Company Ltd. Author interview, Port Vila, November 23, 2012; Mera, F.R. Manager, Vanuatu Financial Intelligence Unit. Author interview, Port Vila, November 20, 2012; Stafford, M. Partner, Barrett and Partners Chartered Accountants and Business Advisors, and Chairman, Financial Centre Association of Vanuatu. Author Interview, Port Vila, November 26, 2012; Vari, N.N. Director, Financial Institutions Supervision Department, Reserve Bank of Vanuatu. Author interview, Port Vila, November 28, 2012.

devote resources is not a straightforward barrier to security governance emerging.

Nonetheless, the degree of Vanuatu's substantive compliance with global AML/CFT rules remains weak, as the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering 2015 report recognizes (APG 2015). Although several high-profile OFC operators have been indicted overseas, Vanuatu has never charged anyone with money laundering/terrorism financing offences. Indeed, its government has sheltered several indicted persons. In one notorious case, a US court indicted two leading OFC figures in 2002, Robert Bohn and Tom Bayer, on charges relating to an online lottery scam, including money laundering. Bayer was protected by the Vanuatu authorities and avoided extradition, but remained on the FBI fugitive list. Bohn, who was adopted by a leading ni-Vanuatu political family, was arrested in the US in 2005 and convicted of all charges. He nevertheless returned to Vanuatu in 2007, eventually becoming the country's first foreign-born parliamentarian (van Fossen 2012, 277).

This gap between formal and substantive compliance is the product of socio-political resistance to the effective operation of Vanuatu's rescaled security governance apparatuses, rooted in the local political economy context. Before independence in 1980, Vanuatu was jointly colonized by France and Britain. Britain established an OFC there in 1971 to reduce Vanuatu's economic dependence on London. The resultant capital influx fueled a wider economic boom, and the financial sector became a key agitator for independence, funding indigenous Anglophone politicians to strengthen their hand against anti-independence French settlers fearful of land confiscations after decolonization (van Fossen 2002, 44–45; Rawlings 2004). Unsurprisingly, Vanuatu's political elites have subsequently been strong backers of the OFC. A “revolving door” was quickly established between OFC institutions and regulators' offices, especially the RBV. The OFC became strongly organized into the Financial Centre Association of Vanuatu, whose resources vastly outweighed those of all other civil society groups in this impoverished nation (van Fossen 2012, 40, 60, 274). Its dominance strengthened with the fragmentation of Vanuatu's dominant one-party system since the 1990s. Because political competition has become non-ideological, with candidates' election funding largely determining their electability, governing coalitions are fluid and cemented by money politics. With few competitors save for the real estate sector, which is tied to the OFC, Vanuatu's financial sector has enormous political influence.

As a result, domestic members of the coalition that apparently supported security governance rescaling were actually significantly divided, with the most powerful

elements only supporting superficial changes to avoid “blacklisting” while seeking to keep transformed state institutions under-resourced, weak, and ineffective. While OFC players and their political allies recognized the need to adopt FATF regulations, they did so to salvage the financial sector, not to quash money laundering. This position was quite different to that of government regulators, who welcomed FATF and Australian intervention as a means of strengthening their capacity for “good governance.” Many of them appeared personally committed to their cause, partly supporting the poststructuralist “governmentality” thesis. But their efficacy is constantly undermined by deliberate constraints on the rest of the AML/CFT regime, highlighting the importance of wider societal power relations. The FIU has passed several cases to the TCU, but no one has ever been charged. The TCU's chief blames this on resource constraints imposed by the government.<sup>4</sup> Similarly, the Director of Public Prosecutions states that, even if the TCU did file charges, her department lacks the capacity to properly investigate and prosecute suspects.<sup>5</sup>

Though these dynamics may simply appear to reflect Vanuatu's status as a relatively poor country, this simple interpretation would overlook the commitment of significant domestic resources, in addition to extensive foreign capacity-building assistance, and the considerable costs of compliance to the country's economy (see Sharman and Mistry 2008, chaps. 10–12). A more accurate explanation of governance outcomes highlights the role of powerful domestic interests. The FIU, initially established with no staff, was allocated the necessary resources in 2005, one year before the first APG review, which allowed Vanuatu to protect the reputation of its OFC. Subsequently, however, the government has withheld the resources needed for proper law-enforcement, reflecting the real interests driving policy. Thus, during 2012–13, when Australian police officers were expelled from Vanuatu, the TCU fell into disarray, with basic equipment like computers and photocopiers breaking down. This made it impossible for officers to perform their necessary functions. This strategic under-funding of key nodes in the security governance regime ensures that its implementation skirts around Vanuatu's most powerful interests. Unsurprisingly, regulators therefore identify their role as working with the OFC to find a compromise between their

- 4 Banimataku, A. Team Leader, Transnational Crime Unit, Vanuatu Police Force. Author interview, Port Vila, November 21, 2012.
- 5 Tavoia, K. Director, Vanuatu Department of Public Prosecutions. Author interview, Port Vila, November 21, 2012.

need for secrecy to maintain the tax haven's competitiveness, and FATF's demand for transparency.<sup>6</sup>

The net result has apparently been the displacement of money laundering activities outside of and within Vanuatu. OFC operators complain—apparently justifiably—that the inordinate Australian pressure on Vanuatu has prompted investors to relocate their funds to other tax havens like Singapore and London, where Australian influence is much weaker and illicit activity is “harder to find”.<sup>7</sup> The OFC seems to be following the money, seeking new clients in Asia, far-removed from Australia's gaze (Macdonald 2012). OFC players have also redirected their resources into domestic real estate speculation: long-term “leases” have alienated up to 80 percent of coastal lands in Vanuatu's main island of Efate from their customary owners. This has apparently become a useful means of laundering money and providing kickbacks to politicians able to provide land development permits (Garrett 2011). In 2015, hidden relationships between the OFC and leading politicians were exposed when 18 Members of Parliament, including the deputy prime minister, were charged with and later mostly convicted of giving and receiving bribes in connection with airport redevelopment. The funds used for bribery were traced to the OFC firm PITCO, managed by Thomas Bayer, though at the time of writing he has yet to face trial.

In sum, despite the considerable resources poured into AML/CFT governance in Vanuatu and an appearance of implementation, actual outputs have molded around the interests of the powerful OFC. Governance transformation has occurred, but largely with the aim of mollifying international regulators, not preventing money laundering.

### Senegal

Money laundering has a long pedigree in Senegal. Due to the decade-long political crisis in nearby Côte d'Ivoire, formerly Francophone West Africa's strongest economy, Senegal became a regional financial center and economic hub, with Dakar hosting multiple international organizations and agencies. In recent years, Senegal's security forces have participated in numerous transnational security and capacity-building initiatives with Western

governments and IOs aimed at tackling non-traditional security threats, including drug trafficking and money laundering (see Sandor 2016b). The West African sub-region's FSRB, the Inter-governmental Action Group Against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA), is headquartered in Dakar, as are the headquarters of the Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO). GIABA identifies Senegal as a subregional leader in AML/CFT efforts (GIABA 2014, 52). However, deeper examination reveals that Senegal's success remains shallow, with high-level, large-scale money-laundering continuing. AML/CFT governance is constrained by the activities of high-level political officials connected to Senegal's presidents and political party apparatuses. Senegalese law enforcement agencies, under the direction of ministers and other political elites, use AML/CFT laws selectively against their patrons' political adversaries, while pursuing legitimate investigations against politically unconnected individuals to impress international partners.

Unlike in Vanuatu, where a socio-political coalition embraced AML/CFT governance rescaling to defend the OFC's existence, financial interests in Senegal are weaker; the main motivation for governance change was to maintain good relations with external donors. Senegal is highly aid-dependent: in 2000, it ranked eighteenth in the world for aid dependency, with foreign aid comprising almost 55 percent of government spending (Action Aid 2011, 20). Unsurprisingly, when US, French, and United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) officials requested in 2002 that Senegal's laws be made to correspond to Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and FATF recommendations, then President Abdoulaye Wade promptly agreed.<sup>8</sup> Comprehensive AML/CFT legislation was passed in 2004.

As in Vanuatu, this led to significant formal governance rescaling. Senegal's FIU, the *Cellule Nationale de Traitement des Informations Financières* (CENTIF) was created in March 2005. CENTIF incorporates various state organs into a networked, multi-agency body. Its staff consists of embedded agents from the Senegalese Investigative Police, Customs, Ministry of Justice authorities, BCEAO officials, analysts, and administrative personnel. The FIU is also networked transnationally to West Africa's other FIUs, and to GIABA. It was admitted to the Egmont Group in 2009, and regularly shares information with its members on active AML/CFT investigations, requesting information on 24 cases in 2014 alone (CENTIF 2015, 31). In 2016, CENTIF was even

6 Toka, E.R. Liquidation and Legal Officer, Insolvency, Legal, Enforcement, and Compliance Department, Vanuatu Financial Services Commission. Author interview, Port Vila, November 27, 2012.

7 Bayer, Tom M. Chairman, Pacific International Trust Company Ltd. Author interview, Port Vila, November 23, 2012.

8 US Legal Official. Personal Communication, Dakar, March 20, 2017.

mentoring Kosovo's FIU staff via this global network. CENTIF has received extensive capacity-building and technical assistance, notably from France, the US, the EU, UNODC, and GIABA experts. From 2012–2015, CENTIF received €600,000 in direct support from the EU alone, and it benefits from regular interactions with an AML/CFT program officer based at the EU Delegation in Dakar.<sup>9</sup> The Senegalese Judicial Police, Gendarmerie, and Justice officials have also received extensive training by Western actors,<sup>10</sup> while World Bank and IMF experts have provided CENTIF and connected state agencies with guiding principles on financial law enforcement.<sup>11</sup> The process of transnational regulatory networking and security governance reconfiguration around CENTIF has been extensive and well resourced, again defying Security Governance scholars' expectations that non-European recipients would resist security governance innovations as undermining national sovereignty.

As in Vanuatu, this has produced extensive formal compliance with FATF rules. Since the FIU's creation, Senegalese banks have steadily (albeit modestly) increased their STRs to CENTIF in compliance with BCEAO laws and directives and the 2004 AML/CFT law.<sup>12</sup> In Mali, by contrast, when UNODC programmers conducted capacity-building workshops for Malian bank employees, no participant had ever seen an STR. For many Western agencies, Senegal's officials and banking sector appear as ideal AML/CFT students.<sup>13</sup> In reality, however, even these officials admit that the level of bank compliance remains minimal, and AML/CFT investigations rarely happen due to a lack of resources and technical expertise, and, more importantly, resistance from the highest levels of government.<sup>14</sup>

Indeed, this security governance regime's substantive outputs have been constrained by socio-political struggles and patronage politics rooted in Senegal's political economy context. Since independence, Senegalese political elites have used state institutions as a vector of wealth accumulation and the principal means of maintaining the patron-client relations that underpin state power. In turn, Senegal's state apparatuses are today heavily dependent on Western aid flows. As with many post-colonial states, Senegal was forced to undergo seven years of structural adjustment by the IMF and World Bank from 1984/5. Initially, the incumbent Parti Socialiste regime

resisted real reforms, recognizing they would restrict its ability to service patron-client ties. However, the International Financial Institutions' punishing devaluation of the West African Franc in 1994 compelled a change of strategy, and successive governments have instead cultivated donor approval to gain access to external resources, which they use to cultivate domestic support (Diop 2006, 107–108). The Senegalese state has thereby become heavily aid-dependent, with overseas development assistance valued at around 10 percent of Gross National Income from the mid-1980s to 2004 (Diop 2006, 107–108; Birdsall 2007, 576). Ironically, this extroversion of the state—with little attention paid to domestic revenue-collection and thereby reduced political pressure for governmental accountability—has given political elites significant maneuvering room. Along with technocrat-led economic reforms, power has concentrated in the executive's hands (see Diop 2006; Juul 2006).

Neoliberal reform has also helped foster money laundering in Senegal. While money laundering began in the early 1990s through criminal networks involved in large-scale fraud and counterfeit cash printing, it accelerated and became entrenched during the 2000s' rapid economic liberalization under President Wade's *Parti Democratique Sénégal* (PDS) government.<sup>15</sup> During this period, rule in Senegal became synonymous with Wade's "Big Man" style, nepotism, and a large politico-economic and religious entourage borne of the co-optation of political opponents (Copans 2010). Simultaneously, Wade courted several international actors, using his liberal economic and Islamic credentials to curry favor with the World Bank, US, China, and several Middle Eastern governments. In return, Wade received grants, low-interest loans, and many "personal gifts". He multiplied government ministries to provide his supporters with ministerial positions, granting them leniency in administrative action and crucial access to international actors. In return for support, Wade also distributed lucrative public contracts for major infrastructural and other state-funded projects, and directorships in Senegal's multiplying public sector agencies to his clients (Mbow 2008; Gifford 2016). Senegal's economic reputation as a stable place to invest grew within the sub-region, and West African ministers and government officials, some with direct connections to drug trafficking networks, increasingly invested in properties along Dakar's coastline.<sup>16</sup>

While Senegal's economic and developmental boom in the capital and other influential cities drew

9 EU Official. Author Interview, Dakar, June 30, 2016.

10 US Official. Author Interview, Dakar, June 25, 2016.

11 CENTIF Official. Author Interview, Dakar, July 8, 2016.

12 CENTIF Official. Author Interview, Dakar, July 8, 2016.

13 UN Officials. Author Interview, Dakar, July 5, 2016.

14 UN Official. Author Interview, Dakar, June 24, 2016; US Officials. Author Interview, Dakar, December 5, 2016.

15 Senegalese Investigatory Journalist. Author Interview, Dakar, June 25, 2016.

16 UN Official. Author Interview, Dakar, June 24, 2016.

international praise, the formation of the system of governance based on Wade's "trafficking of influence" also permitted widespread embezzlement of state funds, further increasing money laundering.<sup>17</sup> Given the political economy of Wade's government, it can be inferred that his ruling coalition had little real interest in tackling money laundering. The adoption of FATF's Recommendations was more about appeasing donors and avoiding FATF sanctions. The governance rescaling that has occurred has been used to help gather incriminating evidence on Wade's rivals (Diop 2006, 113), enmeshing AML/CFT governance into Senegal's factional conflicts.

The design of Senegal's AML/CFT regime, which permits extensive government control to protect important clients and attack rivals, is evidence of the aforementioned dynamics. For example, while CENTIF is formally autonomous, it is still under the authority of the Ministry of Economy and Finance. Its minister and the secretary-general are appointed by the president, and hold enormous influence over CENTIF's budget and operations. This allows the stifling of investigations into money laundering involving individuals connected to the ruling elite.<sup>18</sup> Similarly, the Minister of Justice appoints whether CENTIF investigations actually generate prosecutions. The procedures specified in the 2004 AML/CFT law also create opportunities for perpetrators to escape prosecution. For example, upon receiving a report from CENTIF, the law requires the Office of the Prosecutor to "immediately cede" the dossier to a Judge of Inquiry. The judge is then responsible for gathering evidence in cooperation with the police's Division of Criminal Investigation. Ministry of Justice officials are fully aware, however, that Judges of Inquiry are few and vastly overloaded by legal cases, including ones considered more serious (e.g. violent crime) or less politically risky. Since money-laundering suspects can only remain in custody for forty-eight hours, and the statute of limitation is only three years, many successfully evade justice. For example, of the 86 CENTIF investigations sent to the Office of the Prosecutor from 2006–2011, fewer than 10 were investigated by law enforcement.<sup>19</sup> From January to June 2016, only six money-laundering cases were sent to

the Prosecutor, and only one or two of these cases are likely to be investigated.<sup>20</sup>

Accordingly, the operation of Senegal's AML/CFT regime is heavily politicized and reflects struggles between contending socio-political coalitions in this highly corrupt political economy context. As coalitions struggle to access lucrative state offices and resources, political elites frequently trade accusations of money laundering while those in power direct AML/CFT institutions against rivals. In 2009, for example, President Wade's arch-rival, Macky Sall, was accused of money laundering offences, in league with illicit financiers based in Gabon (Africa Confidential 2013). During his 2012 election campaign, Sall was again accused of money laundering by Wade loyalist and former Interior Minister Ousmane Ngom, who claimed Sall had admitted his guilt before Senegal adopted its AML/CFT laws.<sup>21</sup> The politicization of the AML/CFT regime was such that CENTIF's president, Ngouda Fall Kane, resigned, citing political interference by the then minister of economy and finance, another Wade loyalist who shielded the "financial mafia that prevails in the country" from investigation and prosecution.<sup>22</sup> After Macky Sall was elected president in 2012, he behaved identically, arresting members of Wade's inner circle and top PDS lieutenants—including Wade's son and former minister Karim Wade—for money laundering, "illicit enrichment," and embezzlement of state funds (Carayol 2012; Collette 2013; Ba 2015). Sall's interior minister, Mbaye Ndiaye, also arrested his predecessor and his wife on related charges. Sall's opponents have struck back, alleging his younger brother's involvement in a fraud case involving supposed mobster Franck Timmis. In 2017, Dakar mayor Khalifa Sall, widely seen as a potential challenger to President Sall in the 2019 elections, was also arrested for money laundering, fraud, and criminal conspiracy. Thus, far from reflecting a successful inculcation of "governmentality" or creation of a bulwark against transnational security threats, the vitality of Senegal's AML/CFT regime reflects its status as a tool for sidelining domestic political opponents.

Beyond these high-profile tussles, Senegal's political economy and neo-patrimonial politics also create structural constraints for the day-to-day operations of its AML/CFT regime. One basic constraint is the informal and cash-based nature of the Senegalese economy, where

17 GIABA Official. 2016. Author Interview, Dakar, July 4, 2016.

18 BCEAO Official. 2016. Author Interview, Dakar, July 2, 2016.

19 Anti-Corruption NGO Official. Author Interview, Dakar, July 4, 2016.

20 Senegalese Magistrate. Author Interview, Dakar, July 7, 2016.

21 PDS Official. Author Interview, Dakar, July 1, 2016.

22 Senegalese Investigatory Journalist. Author Interview, Dakar, June 25, 2016.

under 25 percent of the population use the formal banking system.<sup>23</sup> Many Senegalese distrust banking, bankers, and digitalization schemes, and hold a profound faith in the value of cash. Accordingly, notaries and real estate agents in high-class Dakar neighborhoods routinely accept briefcases full of cash for large-scale real estate and land deals without filing STRs.<sup>24</sup>

Non-compliance, however, is not merely the product of cultural preferences. It also reflects the risks of filing STRs in a society riddled with patronage networks. Despite regular UNODC, CENTIF and GIABA “sensitization workshops” aimed at reporting entities, officials understand that filing STRs could be very dangerous, as word could easily get back to those being investigated, leading to reprisals that might damage trust or their business, or put individuals in direct danger.<sup>25</sup> This is particularly true with respect to “Politically Exposed Persons” (PEPs), whom FATF guidelines state should face particular scrutiny.

In practice, however, CENTIF has never received STRs involving politico-economic and religious elites connected to current governments, and staff do not expect to in the near future. On the contrary, these individuals receive preferential treatment in banks. Thus, because of the political economy context, FATF’s principle of “know your customer,” which is meant to encourage compliance, actually discourages it, since bank compliance officers know how these elites act as key influencers in Senegalese politics.<sup>26</sup> Dakar’s Citibank branch allegedly faced severe difficulties in filing STRs connected to PEPs, and now grants PEPs a free hand to avoid harm to their Senegalese business.<sup>27</sup> It is even rumored that Senegalese money laundering politico-business elites are behind the establishment of the new Bank of Dakar to facilitate their activities (see Roger and Ba 2016).<sup>28</sup> Thus, while CENTIF officials may espouse a “governmentality in the making,” bank officials in Senegal certainly do not (see Favarel-Garrigues et al. 2011, 180). As in other similarly structured Western African economies, the pragmatic approach for banks is to ignore FATF Recommendations around PEPs (Imbert 2014, 14).

Unsurprisingly, investigations that do occur tend to target small-time criminals unconnected to the Senegalese political elite (see Roger 2016). Performers and musicians like Mame Ngor Diazaka and Thione Seck (see Ndiaye 2015), promoters and professional wrestlers, citizens of other West African states, and other politically unconnected individuals have been charged and convicted for money laundering activities. The amounts laundered in these cases pale in comparison to the amounts laundered by laundering of monies derived from grand corruption by many Senegalese political elites. Moreover, for all the capacity-building assistance and mentoring Senegalese law enforcement officials and CENTIF have received, it was not until 2014 that they were able to recover proceeds from money laundering enterprises for the first (and thus far only) time.<sup>29</sup>

In Senegal, as in many other countries, corruption and money laundering go hand in hand (Chaikin and Sharman 2009; Sharman 2017). Significant state transformation and security governance rescaling has occurred, with existing state institutions being reconfigured and new ones created to fight money laundering as part of a complex, transnational network. Senegal is viewed as a model for pursuing money laundering investigations. However, the local political economy of corruption, democratic competition, and rapid economic liberalization and urban development characterized by intense “Big Man” politics and enduring patron-client relationships significantly shape the operation of globally-networked security institutions. Politico-economic and religious elites involved in massive defrauding of state and international funds are insulated from any transnational security initiatives, and AML/CFT efforts remain hamstrung by the efforts of powerful elites. The amount of effort put into addressing money laundering is thus just enough to appease international donors, the Egmont Group, and other Western partners, but in reality allows for fraudulent activities to proceed relatively unimpeded.

In summary, the contested process of state transformation through the rescaling of security governance is evident in both Vanuatu and Senegal. In both cases, governments adopted FATF’s AML/CFT regime for purposes unrelated to the goals of this security governance project: defending the OFC in tax-haven Vanuatu, and cultivating donor favor in aid-dependent Senegal. Accordingly, the extent of security governance rescaling far exceeded the expectations of conventional Security Governance accounts. Both countries received extensive aid and capacity building, creating functional institutions that

23 CENTIF Officials. 2016. Author Group Interview, Dakar, July 11, 2016.

24 Western Investigatory Journalist. Author Interview, Dakar, July 8, 2016.

25 CENTIF Official. Author Interview, Dakar, July 8, 2016.

26 Senegalese Banker. Author Interview, Dakar, July 9, 2016.

27 Western Investigatory Journalist. Author Interview, Dakar, July 8, 2016.

28 UN Official. Author Interview, Dakar, June 24, 2016; US Official. Author Interview, Dakar, June 25, 2016.

29 CENTIF Officials. Author Group Interview, Dakar, July 11, 2016.



extend beyond “pre-Westphalian” or “Westphalian” governance arrangements. However, while some true believers, especially regulators, supported full rescaling in line with FATF stipulations, in each case more powerful groups with a strong interest in constraining rescaled state apparatuses’ operation eventually won out. In Vanuatu, law enforcement warped around the OFC and associated interests, while in Senegal patronage politics and factional conflict severely constrained governance. In both cases, this limited the regime’s ability to tackle a specific security threat. Hence, in both cases the AML/CFT regime did little to actually prevent money laundering.

## Conclusion

This article has built on existing literature to develop a new framework for understanding the emergence and operation of novel forms of transnational security governance. In so doing we have pushed beyond the limitations of the Security Governance scholarship, which first noted and sought to explore this phenomenon, but unfortunately became constrained by its functionalist, Eurocentric origins. We have also moved past approaches conceiving these new modes of governance generically as networks, specifying that transboundary security governance operates primarily through efforts to transform and rescale state apparatuses where threats are seen to originate. Analyzing the contestation surrounding this can explain the exact form and operation of these regimes on the ground.

The AML/CFT case clearly illustrates the problems inherent in existing Security Governance approaches, and highlights the utility of our framework. The global AML/CFT regime does not operate through EU-style multilateralism. Instead, a small, self-appointed group defines a strict template for domestic governance that is then rolled out globally through a combination of coercion and capacity-building. The process is designed to transform domestic governance apparatuses and integrate them into transnational regulatory networks. AML/CFT governance is thus produced through attempts to rescale state apparatuses.

Importantly, this process is not limited to “post-Westphalian,” Western states. The FATF regime has been adopted by virtually every jurisdiction including, as our case studies show, states that Security Governance scholars would brand “Westphalian” or “pre-Westphalian.” Contrary to expectations, these states do not simply reject security governance and cling to “outdated” norms of sovereignty. Rather, the extent to which security governance is transformed depends on the contested process of state transformation in each jurisdiction, which

is shaped by local power relations. Nor, conversely, are “post-Westphalian” states immune to this contestation, or necessarily better at producing effective security governance than other states. In fact, local power relations shape security governance outcomes there as much as elsewhere. For instance, experimental evidence shows it is easiest to violate AML/CFT rules in Britain and the US (Findley et al. 2014). It is impossible to explain why an estimated £23–57bn (US\$36bn–89bn) is laundered through Britain annually (Financial Conduct Authority 2014) without reference to City of London’s political influence (see Shaxson 2011). Power relations and struggles can explain institutional weaknesses and incapacity, which Security Governance scholars use as an unexplained *explanans* for outcomes.

Our framework not only enables us to account for real-world outcomes, it also explains, rather than just evaluates, the functional efficacy of governance regimes. Furthermore, although normative analysis of security governance regimes is beyond the scope of this article, our framework has the potential to contribute to the discussion given its clear identification of winners and losers in the emergence of variations of security governance. Adopting our approach can provide Security Governance with a more generalized theory of security governance’s emergence and functions that would allow it to reach its full potential.

## References

- Abbott, Kenneth, and Duncan Snidal. 2009. “The Governance Triangle: Regulatory Standards Institutions and the Shadow of the State.” In *The Politics of Global Regulation*, edited by Walter Mattli and Ngaire Woods, 44–88. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Abrahamsen, Rita, and Michael C. Williams. 2011. *Security beyond the State: Private Security in International Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Action Aid. 2011. *Real Aid: Ending Aid Dependency*. 2011, September 13. London. Available at: [http://www.actionaid.org/sites/files/actionaid/real\\_aid\\_3.pdf](http://www.actionaid.org/sites/files/actionaid/real_aid_3.pdf).
- Acuto, Michele, and Simon Curtis. 2014. “Tracing Global Assemblages, Bringing Bourdieu to the Field: A Conversation with Rita Abrahamsen and Michael Williams.” In *Reassembling International Theory: Assemblage Thinking and International Relations*, eds. Michele Acuto and Simon Curtis, 25–31. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Adler, Emanuel, and Patricia Greve. 2009. “When Security Community Meets Balance of Power: Overlapping Regional Mechanisms of Security Governance.” *Review of International Studies* 35 (1): 59–84.
- Adler-Nissen, Rebecca, and Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen, eds. 2008. *Sovereignty Games: Instrumentalising State Sovereignty in Europe and Beyond*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

- Africa Confidential. 2013. "Wade's Barons Under Scrutiny." *Africa Confidential* 54 (2): January 18. Accessed September 7, 2018. [https://www.africa-confidential.com/article-preview/id/4757/Wade's\\_barons\\_under\\_scrutiny](https://www.africa-confidential.com/article-preview/id/4757/Wade's_barons_under_scrutiny).
- Amicelle, Anthony, and Gilles Favarel-Garrigues. 2012. "Financial Surveillance: Who Cares?" *Journal of Cultural Economy* 5 (1): 105–24.
- APG. 2015. "Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing Measures: Vanuatu. Mutual Evaluation Report." Sydney: Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering.
- Avant, Deborah. 2016. "Pragmatic Networks and Global Governance: Explaining Governance Gains in Private Military and Security Services." *International Studies Quarterly* 60 (2): 330–42.
- Avant, Deborah, and Virginia Haufler. 2018. "Public–Private Interactions and Practices of Security." In *The Oxford Handbook of International Security*, ed. Alexandra Gheciu and William C. Wohlforth, ch. 24. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Avant, Deborah, and Oliver Westerwinter, 2016a. "Introduction: Networks and Transnational Security Governance." In *The New Power Politics: Networks and Transnational Security Governance*, ed. Deborah Avant and Oliver Westerwinter, 1–18. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- , eds. 2016b. *The New Power Politics: Networks and Transnational Security Governance*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Ba, Diadie. 2015. "Senegal Jails ex-president's Son for Six Years for Corruption." *Reuters Africa*, Accessed August 20, 2015. <http://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFKBN0MJ1BE20150323?sp=true>.
- Babarinde, Olufemi. 2011. "The African Union and the quest for security governance in Africa." In *The Security Governance of Regional Organizations*, edited by Emil J. Kirchner and Roberto Domínguez, 273–299. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Bevir, Mark, and Ian Hall. 2014. "The Rise of Security Governance." In *Interpreting Global Security*, ed. Mark Bevir, Oliver Daddow and Ian Hall, 17–34. London: Routledge.
- Bigo, Didier. 2001. "The Möbius Ribbon of Internal and External Security(Ies)." In *Identities, Borders, Orders: Rethinking International Relations Theory*, ed. Mathias Albert, David Jacobson and Yosef Lapid, 91–116. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- , 2013. "Security: Analysing Transnational Professionals of (in)security in Europe." In *Bourdieu in International Relations: Rethinking Key Concepts in IR*, ed. Rebecca Adler-Nissen, 114–30. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Birdsall, Nancy. 2007. "Do No Harm: Aid, Weak Institutions and the Missing Middle in Africa." *Development Policy Review* 25 (5): 575–98.
- Breslin Shaun and Croft Stuart, eds. 2012. *Comparative Regional Security Governance*. London: Routledge.
- Bures, Oldrich, and Helena Carrapico, eds. 2017. *Security Privatization: How Non-Security-Related Private Businesses Shape Security Governance*. Cham, Switzerland: Springer International Publishing.
- Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde. 1998. *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
- Carayol, Rémi. 2012. "Sénégal: Les Barons Du Régime Wade Face à La Justice, Les Dessous D'une Affaire D'état." *Jeune Afrique*, November 26. Accessed December 13 2012. <http://www.jeuneafrique.com/139225/politique/s-n-gal-les-barons-du-r-gime-wade-face-la-justice-les-dessous-d-une-affaire-d-tat/>.
- CASE Collective. 2006. "Critical Approaches to Security in Europe: A Networked Manifesto." *Security Dialogue* 37 (4): 443–87.
- CENTIF. 2015. *Rapport Annuel 2014*. Dakar: Government of Senegal.
- Chaikin, David, and Jason C. Sharman. 2009. *Corruption and Money Laundering: A Symbiotic Relationship*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Christou, George, Stuart Croft, Michela Ceccorulli, and Sonia Lucarelli. 2010. "European Union Security Governance: Putting the 'security' Back In." *European Security* 19 (3): 341–59.
- Collette, Elise. 2013. "Sénégal: Un Ancien Député Proche De Wade Incarcéré Pour Blanchiment D'argent." *Jeune Afrique*, January 8. Accessed August 10, 2016. <http://www.jeuneafrique.com/172795/politique/s-n-gal-un-ancien-d-put-proche-de-wade-incarc-r-pour-blanchiment-d-argent/>.
- Copans, Jean. 2010. "Du néo-patrimonialisme Au Big Man: Une Excursion Sénégalaise Au XXI Siècle Au Regard Des Cameroun Et Kenya D'il y a Un Quart Siècle." In *Comparatisme à la croisée des chemins: Autour de l'œuvre de Jean-François Médard*, ed. Dominique Darbon, 43–58. Paris: Karthala.
- Daase, Christopher, and Cornelius Friesendorf, eds. 2010. *Rethinking Security Governance: The Problem of Unintended Consequences*. London: Routledge.
- Diop, Momar-Coumba. 2006. "Le Sénégal à La Croisée Des Chemins." *Politique Africaine* 104: 103–26.
- Dorussen, Han, and Emil J. Kirchner. 2014. "Better a Good Neighbor than a Distant Friend: the Scope and Impact of Regional Security Organizations." *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 14 (1): 117–46.
- Dubash, Navroz K., and Bronwen Morgan, eds. 2013. *The Rise of the Regulatory State of the South: Infrastructure and Development in Emerging Economies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Duffield, Mark. 2001. *Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security*. London: Zed Books.
- Ehrhart, Hans-Georg, Hendrik Hegemann, and Martin Kahl. 2014a. "Putting Security Governance to the Test: Conceptual, Empirical, and Normative Challenges." *European Security* 23 (2): 119–25.
- , 2014b. "Towards Security Governance As a Critical Tool: a Conceptual Outline." *European Security* 23 (2): 145–62.
- Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, Mette. 2016. "Power and Purpose in Transgovernmental Networks: Insights from the Global Non-proliferation Regime." In *The New Power Politics: Networks and Transnational Security Governance*, ed. Deborah Avant and Oliver Westerwinter, 131–68. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Enquête Plus. 2012. "Ngouda Fall Kane, ex-Président de la CENTIF: 'Une Mafia Financière sévit ce pays.'" 19 January.

- Available at: <http://www.enqueteplus.com/content/ngouda-fall-kane-ex-president-de-la-centif-une-mafia-financi%C3%A8re-s%C3%A9vit-dans-ce-pays>.
- FATF. 2012. "International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism & Proliferation - the FATF Recommendations." 16 February. Accessed 7 September 2018. [www.fatf-gafi.org/](http://www.fatf-gafi.org/).
- Favarel-Garrigues, Gilles, Thierry Godefroy, and Pierre Lascombes. 2011. "Reluctant Partners? Banks in the Fight Against Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing in France." *Security Dialogue* 42 (2): 179–96.
- Financial Conduct Authority. 2014. "FAQs Relating to Money Laundering." June 14, 2014. Accessed July 31, 2015. [http://www.fsa.gov.uk/about/what/financial\\_crime/money\\_laundering/faqs#faq2](http://www.fsa.gov.uk/about/what/financial_crime/money_laundering/faqs#faq2).
- Findley, Michael, Daniel Nelson, and J.C. Sharman. 2014. *Global Shell Games: Experiments in Transnational Relations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Garrett, Jemima. 2011. "Foreign Land-Grab Leaves Ni-Vanuatu Out in Cold: Gated Communities, Blocked Beaches, Fallow Farmlands." Pacific Islands Report, *Radio Australia*, February 9, 2011. Accessed August 5, 2013. <http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2011/February/02-10-02.htm>.
- GIABA [Inter Governmental Action Group Against Money Laundering in West Africa]. 2014. *Annual Report 2014*. Dakar: GIABA.
- Gibson, Edward L. 2012. *Boundary Control: Subnational Authoritarianism in Federal Democracies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Gifford, Paul. 2016. "Religion and Politics in Contemporary Senegal." *African Affairs* 115 (461): 688–709.
- Group of Eight. 1999. "Communiqué By the Ministerial Conference of the G-8 Countries on Combating Transnational Organized Crime." Moscow, October 20, 1999.
- Hameiri, Shahar, and Lee Jones. 2015. *Governing Borderless Threats: Non-Traditional Security and the Politics of State Transformation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Harvey, David. 2006. *The Limits to Capital*. London: Verso.
- Hooghe, Liesbet, and Gary Marks. 2001. *Multi-level Governance and European Integration*. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Huysmans, Jef. 2006. *The Politics of Insecurity: Fear, Migration and Asylum in the EU*. London: Routledge.
- Imbert, Anselme. 2014. "Le Paysage Bancaire Africain: Évolutions Récentes Et Perspectives." *Techniques Financières et Développement* 116: 9–15.
- IMF. 2011. *Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism (AML-CFT): Report on the Review of the Effectiveness of the Program*. Washington DC: International Monetary Fund.
- Jackson, Paul. 2012. "Regional Security in Sub-Saharan Africa." In *Comparative Regional Security Governance*, ed. Shaun Breslin and Stuart Croft, 113–30. London: Routledge.
- Jayasuriya, Kanishka. 2001. "Globalization and the Changing Architecture of the State: The Regulatory State and the Politics of Negative co-ordination." *Journal of European Public Policy* 8 (1): 101–23.
- Jervis, Robert. 1982. "Security Regimes." *International Organization* 36 (2): 357–78.
- Jessop, Bob. 2008. *State Power*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Jones, Lee. 2012. *ASEAN, Sovereignty, and Intervention in Southeast Asia*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Juul, Kristine. 2006. "Decentralization, Local Taxation, and Citizenship in Senegal." *Development and Change* 37 (4): 821–46.
- Kaunert, Christian. 2011. *European Internal Security: Towards Supranational Governance in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Kirchner, Emil J. 2007. "Regional and Global Security: Changing Threats and Institutional Responses." In *Global Security Governance: Competing Perceptions of Security in the 21st Century*, ed. Emil J. Kirchner and James Sperling, 3–22. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Kirchner, Emil J., and Roberto Domínguez, eds. 2011a. *The Security Governance of Regional Organizations*. Abingdon: Routledge.
- . 2011b. "Regional Organizations and Security Governance." In *The Security Governance of Regional Organizations*, ed. Emil J. Kirchner and Roberto Domínguez, 1–21. Abingdon: Routledge.
- . 2014. "Security Governance in a Comparative Regional Perspective." *European Security* 23 (2): 163–78.
- Kirchner, Emil J., and James Sperling. 2007. *EU Security Governance*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Kirchner, Emil J., and James Sperling, eds. 2010. *National Security Cultures: Patterns of Global Governance*. London: Routledge.
- Krahmann, Elke. 2003. "Conceptualizing Security Governance." *Cooperation and Conflict* 38 (1): 5–26.
- Larner, Wendy, and William Walters. 2004. *Global Governmentality: Governing International Spaces*. London: Routledge.
- McDonald, Matt. 2008. "Securitization the Construction of Security." *European Journal of International Relations* 14 (4): 563–87.
- Liss, Carolin, and Jason C. Sharman. 2015. "Global Corporate Crime Fighters: Private Transnational Responses to Piracy and Money-Laundering." *Review of International Political Economy* 22 (4): 693–718.
- Macdonald, Roy. 2012. "Leading the Race to Minimal Bureaucracy." *Offshore Investment* 226 (May): 30–1.
- Mbow, Penda. 2008. "Senegal: The Return of Personalism." *Journal of Democracy* 19 (1): 156–69.
- Methmann, Chris, and Angela Oels. 2015. "From 'fearing' to 'empowering' Climate Refugees: Governing climate-induced Migration in the Name of Resilience." *Security Dialogue* 46 (1): 51–68.
- Mittelman, James. 2010. *Hyperconflict: Globalization and Insecurity*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Ndiaye, Amadou. 2015. "Sénégal: Le Chanteur Thione Seck Inculpé Dans Une Affaire De Faux Billets." *Le Monde*, June 3. Accessed January 9, 2017. [http://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2015/06/03/senegal-le-chanteur-thione-seck-inculpe-dans-une-affaire-de-faux-billets\\_4646663\\_3212.html](http://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2015/06/03/senegal-le-chanteur-thione-seck-inculpe-dans-une-affaire-de-faux-billets_4646663_3212.html).

- Ong, Aihwa. 2000. "Graduated Sovereignty in Southeast Asia." *Theory, Culture, and Society* 17 (4): 55–75.
- Percy, Sarah. 2016. "Counter-Piracy in the Indian Ocean: A New Form of Military Cooperation." *Journal of Global Security Studies* 1 (4): 270–84.
- Rawlings, Gregory. 2004. "Laws, Liquidity and Eurobonds: The Making of the Vanuatu Tax Haven." *The Journal of Pacific History* 39 (3): 325–41.
- Roger, Benjamin. 2016. "Sénégal: Boy Djiné, Prêt Pour Une Dixième évation?" *Jeune Afrique*, July 21. Accessed August 11, 2016. <http://www.jeuneafrique.com/mag/342060/societe/senegal-boy-djinne-pret-dixieme-evasion/>.
- Roger, Benjamin, and Mehdi Ba. 2016. "Sénégal: Pourquoi Aliou Sall, Le Frère Cadet Du Président, Déchaîne Les Passions." *Jeune Afrique*, October 3. Accessed January 13 2017. Available at: <http://www.jeuneafrique.com/mag/359818/politique/senegal-aliou-sall-frere-cadet-president-dechaine-passions/>.
- Sandor, Adam. 2016a. "Border Security and Drug Trafficking in Senegal: AIRCOP and Global Security Assemblages." *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding* 10 (4): 490–512.
- . 2016b. "Tightly Packed: Disciplinary Power, the UNODC, and the Container Control Programme in Dakar." *African Studies Review* 59 (2): 133–60.
- Sharman, J. C. 2009. "Privacy As Roguery: Personal Financial Information in an Age of Transparency." *Public Administration* 87: 717–31.
- . 2011. *The Money Laundry: Regulating Criminal Finance in the Global Economy*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- . 2017. *The Despot's Guide to Wealth Management: On the International Campaign Against Grand Corruption*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Sharman, J.C., and Percy Mistry. 2008. *Considering the Consequences: The Development Implications of Initiatives on Taxation, Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Finance of Terrorism*. London: Commonwealth Secretariat.
- Shaxson, Nicholas. 2011. *Treasure Islands: Tax Havens and the Men Who Stole the World*. London: Bodley Head.
- Sperling, James, and Mark Webber. 2014. "Security Governance in Europe: a Return to System." *European Security* 23 (2): 126–44.
- Swyngedouw, Eric A. 1997. "Neither Global Nor Local: 'glocalization' and the Politics of Scale." In *Spaces of Globalization: Reasserting the Power of the Local*, Kevin R. Cox, ed. 137–66. New York: Guildford.
- Tannenwald, Nina. 2007. *The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons Since 1945*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- van Fossen, Anthony. 2002. "Offshore Financial Centres and Internal Development in the Pacific Islands." *Pacific Economic Bulletin*, 17 (1): 38–62.
- . 2012. *Tax Havens and Sovereignty in the Pacific Islands*. Queensland: University of Queensland Press.
- Vanuatu FIU. 2009. *2009 Annual Report*. Port Vila: State Law, Government of Vanuatu.
- Wæver, Ole. 2011. "Politics, Security, Theory." *Security Dialogue* 42 (4-5): 465–80.
- Wagnsson Charlotte, James Sperling and Jan Hallenberg. eds. 2009. *European Security Governance: The European Union in a Westphalian World*. London: Routledge.
- Webber, Mark, Stuart Croft, Jolyon Howorth, Terry Terriff, and Elke Krahnmann. 2004. "The Governance of European Security." *Review of International Studies* 30 (1): 3–26.
- Wolff, Sarah, Nicole Wichmann, and Gregory Mounier. 2009. *The External Dimension of Justice and Home Affairs: A Different Security Agenda for the European Union?*. London: Routledge.