ASEAN intervention in Cambodia: from Cold War to conditionality

Lee Jones
Nuffield College, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK

Online Publication Date: 01 December 2007
To cite this Article: Jones, Lee (2007) ‘ASEAN intervention in Cambodia: from Cold War to conditionality’, The Pacific Review, 20:4, 523 - 550
To link to this article: DOI: 10.1080/09512740701672001
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09512740701672001
ASEAN intervention in Cambodia: from Cold War to conditionality

Lee Jones

Abstract
Despite their other theoretical differences, virtually all scholars of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) agree that the organization’s members share an almost religious commitment to the norm of non-intervention. This article disrupts this consensus, arguing that ASEAN repeatedly intervened in Cambodia’s internal political conflicts from 1979 to 1999, often with powerful and destructive effects. ASEAN’s role in maintaining Khmer Rouge occupancy of Cambodia’s UN seat, constructing a new coalition government in exile, manipulating Khmer refugee camps and informing the content of the Cambodian peace process will be explored, before turning to the ‘creeping conditionality’ for ASEAN membership imposed after the 1997 ‘coup’ in Phnom Penh. The article argues for an analysis recognizing the political nature of intervention, and seeks to explain both the creation of non-intervention norms and specific violations of them as attempts by ASEAN elites to maintain their own illiberal, capitalist regimes against domestic and international political threats.

Keywords
ASEAN; Cambodia; intervention; norms; non-interference; sovereignty.

Introduction
Discussion of ASEAN’s normative regimes like the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) and the Zone of Peace and Neutrality (ZOPFAN), resistance to human rights criticism, or the development of the ASEAN Regional Forum (Acharya 2001; Leifer 1996; Tang 1995) have all emphasized the cardinal norms of ‘rigidly demarcated and sacrosanct boundaries, mutual recognition of sovereign political entities, and non-intervention in the affairs of other states’, apparently proving Mohammed Ayoob’s (1995:...
71) observation that ‘third-world elites have internalised these values to an astonishing degree’. To such a degree, indeed, that this paralysed ASEAN during and since the 1997–98 Asian financial crisis. Analysts referred to ASEAN’s ‘non-intervention problem’, declaring that ‘either interference becomes legitimate, or the Association will become increasingly meaningless. The ASEAN Way ends here’ (Moller 1998: 1104). This article challenges this consensus by showing that ASEAN states repeatedly intervened in the internal political conflicts of Cambodia between 1979, when Vietnam invaded Cambodia and overthrew the Khmer Rouge, and 1999, when Cambodia was finally admitted to ASEAN.

The Cambodian case is complex, raising many issues and resisting easy summarization. It is chosen here because of its well-recognized centrality to the unity and development of ASEAN in the 1980s. Its selection also highlights the indeterminacy of the literature on ASEAN norms. During this period Cambodia was not an ASEAN member, and so it might simply be argued that ASEAN’s ‘norms’ did not apply or were not violated by intervention. However, the virtually uncontested interpretation of ASEAN’s stance on Cambodia was that it was motivated by ‘embarrassment’ at the violation of its ‘cherished’ norm of non-intervention by Vietnam, and did not intervene itself (e.g. Acharya 2000: 79–129; Alagappa 1993; Antolik 1990: 116; Leifer 1999: 35). This strongly implies that despite the absence of Vietnam and Cambodia from its ranks, ASEAN acted as if the norm extended to Indochina. However, this article will demonstrate that despite its rhetorical adherence to non-interference, ASEAN repeatedly violated its own norms in response to Vietnam’s behaviour. This challenges the claim that ASEAN states’ identities and interests had been ‘transformed’ by norms via a process of ‘socialization’, as the ‘security community’ literature argues (Acharya 2001), and falsifies Leifer’s (1999: 35–6) assertion that ASEAN’s approach to Cambodia from 1997 to 1999 was only the second time it had ever intervened in the internal affairs of another country.

Beginning with a political, historicized reading of ASEAN’s non-intervention norms, the article traces ASEAN’s intervention (understood as coercive interference in an external political community) through the second Cold War and into the 1990s, drawing a contrast between the strong intervention of the 1980s, driven by the imperative to contain revolution, and the weaker intervention of the 1990s, driven mainly by a need to maintain a suspect claim to manage regional order.

**ASEAN’s non-interference norms: a politicized reading**

As Lee Kuan Yew (2000: 369–70) states, ASEAN’s prime raison d’être was to facilitate the continued survival of authoritarian capitalist regimes threatened by internal subversion and the external pressure of the Cold War:
The unspoken objective was to gain strength through solidarity ahead of the power vacuum that would come with an impending British and later a possible US withdrawal... We had a common enemy – the communist threat in guerrilla insurgencies, backed by North Vietnam, China and the Soviet Union. We needed stability and growth to counter and deny the communists the social and economic conditions for revolutions... While ASEAN’s declared objectives were economic, social and cultural, all knew that progress in economic cooperation would be slow. We were banding together more for political objectives, stability and security.

ASEAN was made possible, as Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik pointed out, by the ‘convergence in the political outlook of the five prospective member-nations’ (Khong 1997: 327) after Sukarno’s crusading anti-imperialism was brought to a bloody end by Suharto’s New Order regime. The alignment of reactionary capitalist regimes across the sub-region allowed leaders to cooperate in defeating the key threats to their rule: internal subversion, particularly the threat of communist revolution, against which most ASEAN states had concluded bilateral arrangements by the late 1970s (Snitwongse 1995: 521).

ASEAN’s key ‘norms’ of non-interference, enshrined in the 1967 ASEAN Declaration, the 1971 ZOPFAN Declaration and the 1976 TAC, merely reiterate, in a strict tone, rules already articulated in the UN Charter. That these rules already existed elsewhere begs the question as to why ASEAN would want to recapitulate them. The answer lies in the timing and political functions of each declaration. The ASEAN Declaration aimed to halt the rampant intervention against each other’s rule that had characterized regional international relations hitherto, ‘to ensure [members’] stability and security from external interference in any form... in order to preserve their national identities’ (ASEAN 1967). The goal was to give authoritarian elites sufficient latitude to engage in violent political consolidation in an era when ‘national identities’ were weak or non-existent. ZOPFAN and TAC were direct responses to the deteriorating international environment and the rising power of communist insurgencies. By the mid-1970s, for example, Thailand and the Philippines had both succumbed to dictatorships in reaction to deepening economic malaise and the growing Leftist threat to entrenched economic and political power structures. Marxist guerrillas were active throughout those countries, effectively ruling over hundreds of thousands of people (Alexander 1999: 314; Anderson 1998: 171–83; Girling 1981: 257; Kessler 1989).

To deny the opening for great power intervention provided by civil strife in Indochina, ASEAN vowed to strengthen ‘national resilience’ to ensure ‘stability and security from external interference... in order to preserve...national identities’ (ASEAN 1971). But with the onset of the Nixon Doctrine, ASEAN had to go further and ‘reserve’, as Marcos put it, ‘the right to make [its] own accommodations with the emerging realities in Asia’
The Pacific Review

(Silverman 1975: 920–1). TAC, emerging in the context of the enormous boost given to the region’s communist movements by revolutionary victory in Indochina in 1975, stressed ‘mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity and national identity of all nations’, ‘the right of every State to lead its national existence free from external interference, subversion, or coercion’ and ‘non-interference in the affairs of one another’ (ASEAN 1976). ASEAN hoped to contain the spread of revolution by offering this quid pro quo to Indochina’s new communist states, in the vain hope they would adopt a self-denying ordinance.

ASEAN’s international ‘norm’ of non-intervention was actually a domestically determined political principle, developed to defend weak, capitalist regimes from externally sponsored revolution. As Justin Rosenberg argues:

> the ‘international’ has also been very much about the management of change in domestic political orders . . . a counter-revolutionary foreign policy is rarely just a foreign policy. To a degree which varies with individual cases it is also directed inwards, a nationalist identification of certain programmes of domestic political change with a foreign threat. (Rosenberg 1994: 35)

Since interventions are essentially actions designed to change political outcomes in an external political community, we could regard as interventionist such actions as Malaysia’s military aid against communist guerrillas in Indonesian Borneo, successful Malaysian–Indonesian efforts to defuse the Muslim insurgency in the southern Philippines, and ASEAN’s backing of Indonesia’s annexation of East Timor. That such actions were welcomed indicates that what ASEAN elites sought to defend was not an abstract normative principle but their own precarious social orders – all of which were shored up in these instances. The same pattern is expressed in Thailand’s sponsorship of armed rebel groups in Burma on the understanding that they would help crush the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) and prevent it linking up with the Communist Party of Burma (Smith 1991: 297–9). When Vietnam invaded Cambodia in December 1978, overthrowing Pol Pot and installing a new government, the People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK), and forcing Khmer Rouge remnants to flee to the Thai border, it raised the spectre of spreading revolution and toppling ‘dominoes’. Despite its rhetorical adherence to the ‘norm’ of non-intervention, ASEAN was driven by this spectre to intervene in the Cambodian conflict.

**Intervention in the 1980s: representation, rebels and refugees**

**Representation: ASEAN’s UN activism on behalf of the Khmer Rouge**

The UN Security Council considered Vietnam’s intervention in January and February 1979, but was paralysed by Sino-Soviet rivalry. The USSR
vetoed proposed resolutions against its Vietnamese ally, while Beijing invaded northern Vietnam to ‘punish’ Hanoi for overthrowing its client regime in Cambodia. Attention thus shifted to the UN General Assembly (UNGA).

The question of who gets to represent a state at the United Nations is normally a purely bureaucratic process overseen by the Credentials Committee, whose annual reports are usually rubber-stamped without debate by the UNGA. ASEAN politicized this process by successfully campaigning each year for the Khmer Rouge to keep Cambodia’s UN seat. This was a move without precedent and carried serious consequences for the balance of forces inside Cambodia. Using the rhetoric of a defence of non-intervention, ASEAN mobilized Third World states in the UNGA to vote against the PRK’s credentials in favour of those of Democratic Kampuchea (DK), represented by Ieng Sary, Pol Pot’s deputy; sponsor critical annual resolutions on the ‘Situation in Kampuchea’; and hijack Vietnam’s counter-debates on ‘Peace and Stability in Southeast Asia’ to lambaste Hanoi.

ASEAN argued that the PRK was a ‘puppet regime’ established by armed intervention, and that seating it would endorse violations of basic norms of international conduct (A/34/PV.4: 37–8; A/34/PV.4: 51; A/34/PV.62: 1195, 1210; A/34/PV.65: 1251; A/35/PV.34: 687, etc.). Ambassador Romulo of the Philippines argued, for instance, that seating the PRK would ‘set in train a fatal sequence of events … the small and weak nations of the world’ would lose ‘the right to exist except under conditions of bondage and servility’ (A/35/PV.35: 716). The rhetorical linkage of the Cambodian conflict to the UN Charter principles and the majority interests of weak states allowed Singaporean Ambassador Koh to claim that ‘our opposition to Vietnam’s action is based upon principle’ and ‘the right of DK to retain its seat in the UN has become coterminous with the defence of certain fundamental principles of the Charter of the UN’ (A/35/PV.62: 1209; A/35/PV.34: 689).

It would be easy to take such rhetoric as a sign of commitment to the non-intervention norm, as many constructivists do. Comparing ASEAN’s campaign to its reaction to other interventions, however, reveals its stance as political, not principled. The closest parallel is the January 1979 Tanzanian intervention in Uganda which overthrew Idi Amin. The circumstances prompting the intervention were similar; Tanzania advanced a ‘two wars’ thesis identical to Vietnam’s, claiming it acted in self-defence while a simultaneous indigenous uprising actually overthrew the government; and Tanzanian troops remained in Uganda for several years, policing the post-war political settlement. Yet by 1980 the new regime was seated at the United Nations, was recognized by over eighty governments, and ASEAN had raised no hue and cry (Amer 1992: 207–9; Tesón 1997: 116; Wheeler 2000: 119–20; A/34/500/Add.1; A/34/500/Add.1: 3). The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the same year likewise produced little reaction from ASEAN members. Only two spoke at the UN debate and ASEAN rejected Thailand’s suggested joint statement and ‘restructuring’ of Southeast Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO). Thai Foreign Minister Siddhi admitted this was because the intervention...
The Pacific Review

528   The Pacific Review

had ‘no direct bearing’ on the region (S/13724/Add.1; S/PV.2185: 5; Van
der Kroef 1980: 488–9). The new regime was seated at the United Nations
with only a handful of hollow reservations, with Singapore, a member of the
Credentials Committee, voting in favour – hardly a robust defence of ‘prin-
ciple’ (A/35/484: 2–4). Nor had ASEAN campaigned against France’s 1978
intervention to overthrow the Central African Empire’s government; the
new regime was seated without a formal vote (A/35/PV.35: 704–5, 709–10;
A/36/PV.103: 1871–2).

ASEAN’s campaign was thus deeply politicized. Its interventions were
exceptional for an overthrown government to retain its UN
seat, and it carried serious consequences for the course of the Cambodian
conflict. ASEAN was thereby able to deny Vietnam and the PRK victory,
and to use the United Nations and its organs to propagate its view of the
conflict. ASEAN’s campaign of isolation also deprived the PRK of the usual
aid and development assistance usually afforded to poor countries (e.g. from
UNICEF, the World Food Programme (WFP), the IMF, World Bank, etc.),
which made it more difficult for the new government to achieve ‘performance
legitimacy’ (Alagappa 1995), despite its domestic supremacy. Finally, the
UN seat was ASEAN’s bargaining chip, without which, as Ambassador Koh
put it, there would be ‘no incentive [for Vietnam] to negotiate a political
settlement’ favourable to ASEAN’s interests (A/35/PV.34: 689).

Rebels and refugees: Thailand’s aid to the Khmer Rouge

Just as DK’s survival at the United Nations was impossible without ASEAN
backing, so the Khmer Rouge’s military survival was impossible without Thai
assistance. Ieng Sary was saved from Vietnamese capture by being airlifted
to safety by Thai forces. By January 1979 the Thais had prepared camps
for Khmer Rouge soldiers on Thai soil, where they were fed, given medical
treatment, and sent back over the border to fight the Vietnamese. While
the border was mined to keep fleeing refugees out, Thai army trucks took
Khmer Rouge soldiers across at safe points away from Vietnamese forces.
Thai generals confirmed that this direct violation of the international law
on neutrality was official policy. Khmer Rouge bases were established on
Thai soil and the island of Khemara Phumin was fortified as an entrepôt for
Chinese arms. By 1980, Thailand was accused of shipping 500 tons of arms to
the Khmer Rouge every month. US intelligence estimated that Thailand’s
army funnelled US$100 million of arms annually to the Khmer Rouge dur-
ing the 1980s. Thai artillery was often used to cover Khmer Rouge forays
into Cambodia and Thai soldiers would frequently interpose themselves to
prevent ‘hot pursuit’ by Vietnamese forces (Bangkok Post 1979; Daily Tele-
graph 1979a, b; Guardian 1979; Kiernan 2002: 488; Shui 2002; Straits Times
1979a, b, c; Van der Kroef 1990: 235).

Without Thailand’s assistance, the Khmer Rouge could not have survived
as a threat to the PRK. Chinese and Thai aid allowed the Khmer Rouge to
rebuild its forces from under 2,000 to around 40,000. This brought enormous dividends to Thailand’s military regime. Most importantly, Beijing dropped its support for the CPT, urging it to sign a truce, suspending the provision of broadcasting facilities in Yunnan province, and declaring by 1981 that it would not allow the CPT to sour Sino-Thai relations (Alexander 1999: 316). Chinese aid to the Bangkok regime totalled $283 million from 1985 to 1989 alone, and the military also gained preferential access to advanced weapons technology and oil (Kiernan 1993: 218; Shawcross 1984: 126). This, and the rhetoric surrounding the communist threat, allowed the military to control a fifth of the national budget by 1982, shoring up the capitalist dictatorship (Sukhumbhand 1984: 40–1). Assisting the Khmer Rouge also created a buffer zone to contain the possible spread of revolution, and ensured that authority within Cambodia remained contested, which legitimized ASEAN’s continued activism on behalf of DK. As DK’s representative at the United Nations recognized, ‘if the fundamental struggle were to be eliminated, there would be no reason for our debates here, because the Hanoi expansionists would already have achieved in the field the fait accompli of their invasion of Kampuchea’ (A/36/PV.36: 722).

ASEAN’s treatment of refugees fleeing Cambodia was also designed to harm the PRK. Initially, ASEAN states sought to keep the refugees out, believing them to be ‘fifth columnists’ sent to foment revolution. A senior Thai officer estimated that ‘at least 10 per cent’ were ‘Hanoi spies’ sent to ‘undermine the government’, and Bangkok forcibly repatriated tens of thousands into minefields, killing many. Singapore called refugees ‘human bombs’, refusing to accept any, while Malaysia threatened to deport 65,000 of them and adopt a ‘shoot-on-sight’ policy (Antolik 1990: 117; Mysliwec 1988: 95–6; Observer 1979; Richardson 1982: 102–7). However, this anti-communist hysteria gave way to a more manipulative policy when ‘the strategic value of the refugees as a buffer along the border and as a source of support for the re-emerging resistance movement’ was recognized (Terry 2002: 119). Thailand declined to classify those crossing the border as refugees, thereby denying them international legal protection and ensuring that the lead agencies on the border would be the WFP and UNICEF, not the UNHCR with its powerful protection mandate (Amer 1996: 121). This allowed the refugees to be manipulated in three crucial ways.

First, they were used as a population base for the Khmer Rouge and the other resistance factions, which included the Khmer People’s National Liberation Front (KPNLF; led by Son Sann, a former Cambodian prime minister who declared his own liberation government) and Moulinaka (a royalist group led ostensibly by Prince Sihanouk, the former head of state). With the assistance of Thai Task Force 80, civilians were kept captive in these groups’ camps, to which tens of thousands of refugees were forcibly transferred from temporary UNHCR facilities. The UN Border Relief Organization (UN-BRO), set up by the WFP upon its withdrawal in 1983, reported that by 1987 the guerrillas controlled all of the refugee camps and over 260,000 civilians.
ASEAN campaigned annually for UN aid, 50–90 per cent of which was directly appropriated for the war effort. A ‘top UN official’ admitted in 1987 that ‘the border operation is a political operation. It’s the UN system being used to keep the game going.’ Another remarked, ‘if the UN stopped feeding the soldiers’ wives and families, the resistance would stop’ (Terry 2002: 73, 115, 130–1, 137–9; Vickery 1987: 318–20; Mysliwec 1988: 99; New York Times 1979a). Second, the refugees were used to ‘shame’ Vietnam and provide ‘proof’ of the PRK’s unpopularity (though most refugees were fleeing Thai-facilitated warfare). Michael Vickery argues that the UNHCR camp at Khao-I-Dang was established deliberately to attract refugees across the border to assist in these efforts, only to be closed in 1987 when civilians began fleeing the resistance camps en masse (Vickery 1987: 309–10). Third, the refugees formed a useful, flexible ‘human buffer’. Whenever the Vietnamese launched offensives against the resistance camps, such as their 1979 and 1983 raids on KPNLF headquarters at Nong Chang (located on Cambodian soil), ASEAN issued shrill denunciations, claiming Vietnam was ‘invading’ Thailand and ‘slaughtering’ Cambodian innocents in refugee camps; the resultant international outcry induced Vietnam to withdraw. However, Thailand had actually provoked both attacks by seeking to smuggle thousands of guerrillas into Cambodia under the guise of ‘refugee repatriation’ (Van der Kroef 1981: 519; 1983: 19; Vickery 1987: 317; A/35/PV.35: 705). This buffer of human misery also proved most lucrative for the Thai army and the Khmer Rouge, which controlled the local black market trade. Cross-border trade was estimated at US$500,000 per day by 1983, and by 1989 the Khmer Rouge was earning US$2.4 million per month from territory it controlled with Thai assistance (Um 1989: 101; Van der Kroef 1983: 26).

Representation: ASEAN and the formation of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK)

The military imperative of merging the Khmer resistance groups into a ‘united front’, and the diplomatic imperative of distancing ASEAN from a genocidal regime prompted ASEAN to begin leading the attempt, as Lee Kuan Yew put it, ‘to preserve the DK seat in the UN and alter the leadership of the Government of DK’ (Saravanamuttu 1996; Straits Times 1980a, b), since Sihanouk and others had refused the genocidaires’ request to unite (New York Times 1979b; Straits Times 1979d; International Herald Tribune 1979; Yomiuri Shinbun 1979). The urgency of this task increased when the EEC hinted it might vote against DK at the United Nations in 1982. ASEAN feared that others might follow suit, leading eventually to the recognition of the by-now-enraged PRK (Tasker 1982). ASEAN thus redoubled its efforts, using a raft of incentives and threats.

After nine unsuccessful meetings in Bangkok, Son Sann was invited for secret talks in Singapore in April 1981 (Straits Times 1981c; Tasker 1982). By May, Singapore’s foreign minister explained that the aim was no longer a
‘united front’ but a ‘coalition government’ as ‘the term ... carries with it more authority, legitimacy and permanence’ (Straits Times 1981e). Lee publicly warned the Khmer Rouge that it ‘must recognise that the alternative to this is the eventual legitimising of the Vietnamese puppet regime in Kampuchea’ (Straits Times 1980b) – a powerful threat coming from DK’s champion at the United Nations. Singapore pledged to support the non-communist resistance ‘in every possible way’ – but only if it joined the coalition (Japan Times 1981) – denouncing Son Sann when his intransigence stalled negotiations. Thailand threatened to cut off aid to the KPNLF altogether, while cajoling Sihanouk into participating by promising to support his post-war plans for Cambodia (Chanda 1981; Quinn-Judge 1981; Simon 1982b; Straits Times 1981a, b, e). In September, Siddhi embarked on a month-long trip to secure support for the coalition in the West, and in October Singapore brokered a breakthrough agreement to install Sihanouk as president, Son Sann as prime minister and the Khmer Rouge’s Khieu Samphan as deputy prime minister for foreign affairs, with Malaysia pledging aid to give ‘beef and teeth’ to the coalition when full agreement was reached (Financial Times 1981; Straits Times 1981d, 1982). Negotiations on the coalition’s operating parameters were subsequently stalled by Khmer Rouge intransigence, so ASEAN once again stoked speculation that DK would lose its UN seat if a coalition was not formed (Sricharatchanya 1982). Finally, on the eve of the factions’ meeting in Kuala Lumpur on 22 June 1982, Malaysia offered ‘all out economic assistance’ in the event of a coalition, on top of the food, clothes and arms already promised (Straits Times 1982; Xinhua 1982a). Under this welter of carrots and sticks, the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK) was finally formed.

Siddhi’s claim that the formation of the coalition was a ‘domestic affair and the task of the Kampuchean people’ and that ‘neither Thailand nor ASEAN has interfered in this affair’ is obviously false (Xinhua 1982b). The key negotiations for the coalition’s formation took place in ASEAN capitals, not on Kampuchean soil, amidst intense ASEAN diplomacy, cajoling, threats and promises, without the involvement of the heavily invoked ‘Kampuchean people’, with CGDK leaders openly praising ASEAN’s coordinating role. Throughout the 1980s, ASEAN diplomacy repeatedly ‘re-activated’ Sihanouk after multiple resignations over Khmer Rouge abuses in order to keep the coalition together (Chanda 1987; The Nation 1983; Tasker 1982).

The construction of the CGDK radically altered the leadership of the government in exile: to ‘dilute’ the Khmer Rouge’s influence and create a ‘nationalist’ alternative to the communist regime had been an explicit ASEAN aim (Evans and Rowley 1984: 266–8). Malaysia’s Foreign Ministry explained that the goal was to ‘beef up’ the non-communist forces, gradually displace the Khmer Rouge and thereby ‘increase the chances of the non-communist forces returning to Phnom Penh through a political settlement’ (Straits Times 1981f). ASEAN was now able to exploit the involvement of Sihanouk, a revered founding father of the Non-Aligned Movement, to increase support
for its strategy. Explanatory statements indicated that his presence was an important factor in increasing the majority in favour of CGDK recognition at the United Nations in 1982 (Amer 1990: 54). The ‘dilution’ of the Khmer Rouge’s role also allowed Western states to respond to ASEAN’s calls for assistance. This was particularly crucial after the Vietnamese 1984–85 dry season offensive virtually wiped out the CGDK’s camps. Washington responded with an influx of US$20 million, and annual aid ranged from US$17 million to US$32 million thereafter (Kiernan 1993: 199; Mysiwec 1988: 83). However, Jakarta rejected Singapore’s suggestion of direct ASEAN military aid for the CGDK, threatening to leave ASEAN over the matter (Sricharatchanya 1981). Notably, Jakarta was unwilling to legitimize ASEAN’s behaviour by appealing to a right of counter-intervention, nor to confront Hanoi militarily, even via a proxy, since this would openly compromise ASEAN’s ‘offended bystander’ routine. Nevertheless, with Singapore leading the way, a covert Singaporean–Malaysian–Thai–American group was convened regularly in Bangkok to coordinate assistance to the CGDK. This included arms, ammunition, training, communications equipment, food, and the establishment of a Khmer-language KPNLF radio station with British assistance. The three ASEAN states dispensed just under US$70 million and were critical in persuading Washington to participate (Lee 2000: 378–80).

A ‘comprehensive political settlement’: from ICK to UNTAC

There is no space here for detailed discussion of the 1991 Paris Peace Agreements (PPA) or the UNTAC operation that deployed the settlement. Here I simply wish to show that, contra Michael Leifer’s (1999) argument that ASEAN was consigned to a marginal role during the peace process, with the great powers ultimately dictating policy, ASEAN had already devised many of the headline elements of the PPA in the early 1980s.

The Third Indochina War seemed to confirm ZOPFAN’s basic premise, namely that great power involvement in regional politics was often disastrous for the region. As Indonesia’s foreign minister stated, ‘in principle, the Kampuchean problem is a conflict between Vietnam and the PRC’, but Thailand’s attempts to mediate between them was quickly rebuffed since the conflict went to the heart of the Sino-Soviet rivalry (Van der Kroef 1984: 223). ZOPFAN principles were referenced in the 1979 UNGA resolution on the ‘Situation in Kampuchea’ which warned that escalation of the conflict ‘increase[d] the danger of further involvement by outside Powers’, and from 1980 onwards, ZOPFAN was explicitly referenced, with the United Nations endorsing ASEAN’s model of regional security and calling for all states to implement it (A/RES/34/22; A/RES/35/6; A/35/PV.46: 827; A/35/PV.47: 846; A/RES/35/6).

ZOPFAN’s realization, however, depended on the satisfaction of powerful interests in Cambodia. Suharto and Malaysian Prime Minister Hussein Onn discussed how this might be achieved at Kuantan, Malaysia, in March 1980.
The ‘Kuantan Declaration’ proposed a political settlement that ‘specifically recognised Hanoi’s security interests in Kampuchea’ (Van der Kroef 1981: 516–17). Cambodia should be made neutral and non-aligned, with a maximum degree of autonomy, but Hanoi would exercise ‘effective veto power over much of Cambodia’s defence and foreign policy’ (Peou 2000: 140). Van der Kroef (1984) referred to this plan as the ‘Finlandization’ of Cambodia – an attempt to trade off Cambodian sovereignty to achieve regional stability that clearly contradicts the Westphalian expectations of subaltern realism. Thailand and Singapore rejected the proposal not on the grounds that sacrificing Cambodian sovereignty was wrong in principle but on the grounds that it would ‘encourage’ rather than restrain Vietnam (Van der Kroef 1981: 518).

Nevertheless, the Kuantan principle, that Cambodia must sacrifice some of its sovereignty to achieve regional peace, survived in altered form and was enshrined in the notion of a ‘comprehensive political solution’, which entered ASEAN and UN vocabularies from 1980 onwards. This necessitated ‘guarantees against the introduction of foreign forces’ to the country and ‘that an independent and sovereign Kampuchea will not be a threat to its neighbours’ (A/RES/35/6). ASEAN’s campaigning for this option in a context of stalemate led the United States, Japan, China, and even Vietnam to soon begin echoing the need for a ‘neutral’ Cambodia (Van der Kroef 1984: 224–6) and, by the 1980s, they ‘took their cues on the Indochina issue from ASEAN communiqués’ (Simon 1982a: 135). The basic elements of the PPA and the UNTAC operation were identified in these communiqués and ASEAN-sponsored United Nations resolutions as early as 1980–81 (ASEAN 1979, 1980, 1981; A/RES/34/22; A/RES/35/6; A/RES/36/5):

- total withdrawal of foreign troops, to be verified by the United Nations;
- appropriate measures to ensure respect for human rights and the rule of law during the transitional period;
- respect for Cambodian self-determination, to be realized via democratic elections under United Nations auspices;
- repatriation rights for all refugees; and
- the neutralization of Cambodia, including guarantees against the introduction of foreign forces, respect for Cambodian sovereignty, and guarantees that Cambodia could never become a threat to its neighbours.

These elements were enshrined in the 1981 Declaration of the International Conference on Kampuchea (ICK), for which ASEAN campaigned hard, and this became the basis for all future negotiations (UN 1981), which included a series of ‘Informal Meetings’ between the factions in Jakarta in the late 1980s which paved the way for the PPA (Prasad 2001). Each element is reflected in the final settlement deployed by UNTAC (United Nations 1991). Thus, while Leifer correctly noted that ASEAN states were too weak to enforce the settlement themselves and required the Permanent 5 to steer the process
to completion, many of the settlement’s core aspects were determined by ASEAN’s earlier political advocacy. Cambodia was re-born as a semi-sovereign state, losing control over foreign policy decisions normally reserved for individual states, forced to ‘enshrine’ its ‘perpetual neutrality’ in its Constitution, forbidden to host foreign bases or form alliances, and subject to renewed intervention if it ever compromised its neutrality in the future.

This is not to argue that ASEAN was satisfied with all aspects of UNTAC. Indeed, it was alarmed by the depth to which the operation penetrated Cambodia’s state machinery and society, and ASEAN ambassadors repeatedly complained of UNTAC’s ability to ‘do things without ASEAN agreeing’. It intervened successfully to pressure Yasushi Akashi, the UN Special Representative in charge of the mission, not to use his extensive powers, which theoretically allowed him to make decisions when the Supreme National Council, the transitional embodiment of Cambodian sovereignty where all factions were represented, was deadlocked (Goulding 2006).

ASEAN intervention in post-war Cambodia

ASEAN’s post-Cold War ‘projection’

China’s realignment with ASEAN dealt a coup de grâce to most of ASEAN’s communist insurgencies, and the Soviet Union’s post-1986 retrenchment prompted Vietnam to launch doi moi (restructuring) and begin withdrawing from Cambodia: the Cold War in Asia was dying long before the Berlin Wall fell. Stripped of the certainty of ideological struggle, by the early 1990s ASEAN’s environment was characterized by uncertainty: Washington’s desire to maintain its military presence in East Asia, the intentions of China and India, the continuation of the liberal international trade regime on which ASEAN economies depended – all seemed questionable (Snitwongse 1995; Weatherbee 1993). The opportunity provided by the Cold War for ‘projection’ into the planetary game’, which was ‘a source of internal political cohesion because it allowed the state a central role’ (Lädi 1998: 19) had also vanished, replaced by the zeitgeist of ‘globalization’, leading some to declare ‘the end of the nation-state’ (Ohmae 1995). Furthermore, ASEAN states confronted new demands for political participation as a result of economic and social development (Robison and Goodman 1996).6

ASEAN responded to these new uncertainties with a range of initiatives, including the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and the expansion of ASEAN to cover all Southeast Asia (ASEAN-10). These moves reflected less a desire to achieve concrete goals than to maintain the abstract ‘relevance’ of ASEAN so as to preserve its function as a diplomatic caucus, a shield for autocratic-developmentalist regimes against threatening global forces. AFTA and ASEAN’s membership of APEC was driven by a fear that ASEAN might be superseded by APEC or excluded by the apparent ‘bloc-ization’ of the global economy which
threatened to divert the investment that ASEAN’s dirigiste regimes, and social order more broadly, relied upon (Chin 1995: 426; Lim 1996; Weatherbee 1993: 415). The ARF’s development was driven by the fear that large powers were about to initiate an Asia-Pacific security forum that would marginalize ASEAN or consign it to irrelevance (Acharya 1995; Buszynski 1998: 570). Its meetings focused explicitly not on moving towards a concrete telos or resolving specific problems but on enunciating procedural norms (Leifer 1996) – what Laidi (1998: 154–6) calls ‘regionalism without a goal’. And ASEAN-10 was justified most often – in spite of the frequent physical incapacity of the proposed member states – Burma, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam – to participate meaningfully in ASEAN activities (Chin 1995: 428) – not by reference to concrete benefits but to the supposed wishes of ASEAN’s founders. Hinting at the fundamentally reactive nature of ASEAN’s activities, Malaysia’s Mahathir Mohamad conceded: ‘if we appear to be in a hurry, it is only because ASEAN has little lead time to prepare itself against the growing challenges coming its way’ (Mahathir 1992).

This projection without a project produced a fundamental contradiction. ASEAN was basically unwilling to take responsibility for addressing concrete issues in the region, focusing instead on the procedure of the ‘ASEAN Way’, masking its inaction with the grand rhetoric of ‘community’ (Jones and Smith 2002). But simultaneously, external actors who were themselves unwilling to take direct action were able to exploit ASEAN’s claims to manage regional order to force ASEAN to intervene.

From UNTAC to the 1997 ‘coup’

Thailand’s ‘New Look’ policy, launched by Chatichai Choonhavan in 1988, aimed, now that the threat of communism had evaporated, to ‘turn the Indochina battlefield into a trading market’, with a ‘Greater Thailand’ at the centre of a regional economic hub (Um 1991: 246–8), with Bangkok’s apparent willingness to recognize the PRK again giving the lie to any ‘principled’ stand. Although the suddenness of the move took other ASEAN states by surprise (Van der Kroef 1990: 229), and was resisted by the Thai military, soon this policy of economic predation was replicated across the region. By the mid-1990s, ASEAN states were Cambodia’s major trading partners and, along with Japan, controlled most of its natural resources. Capital-starved Cambodia depended heavily on ASEAN, with Singapore investing US$35 million and Thailand, US$47 million. Malaysia became Cambodia’s largest foreign investor, with total investments exceeding US$109 million (Moller 1998: 1095; Peou 2000: 373–4).

ASEAN had a basic interest in safeguarding these investments by encouraging stability, which looked precarious by the mid-1990s. The 1993 elections produced a fragile coalition between the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) led by former PRK Prime Minister Hun Sen, and the royalist party FUNCINPEC (formerly Moulinaka) led by Prince Ranariddh, son of Prince
Sihanouk. Hun and Ranariddh served as second and first prime minister, respectively, but the 1993 Electoral Law allowed only one prime minister to emerge from the 1998 elections. This, in addition to ingrained patronage systems, the lack of democratic culture, and profound disagreement about how to deal with renewed Khmer Rouge insurgency, fuelled conflict between these former sworn enemies (Findlay 1995: 110; Roberts 2002: 522–8). ASEAN’s interventions to maintain calm mainly took the form of threats of withdrawal. Malaysian Foreign Minister Badawi, dispatched to Phnom Penh in May 1996, warned ‘against any escalation of violence and said that open hostilities would force ASEAN to leave Cambodia alone’. In December, Mahathir wrote to Hun and Ranariddh, ‘urging them to settle their differences and to ensure political stability in the country’. Singapore’s Prime Minister Goh made a pointed statement in November, stressing the continued need for stability if investment were to continue. Suharto himself led a large Indonesian delegation to Cambodia in February 1997 to repeat the ASEAN line on stability, while Philippine Foreign Minister Domingo Siazon began to raise doubts about Cambodia’s membership of ASEAN (Peou 2000: 373–5).

Nevertheless, in July 1997 the situation in Cambodia exploded into violence in what is usually referred to as Hun Sen’s ‘coup’ against Ranariddh. Critical accounts, however, show that Ranariddh had entered into military alliance with the Khmer Rouge and was smuggling arms and soldiers into Phnom Penh to overthrow Hun Sen. Indeed, the government troops that moved against Ranariddh did so on the orders of the bipartite Commission of Eight, established to manage tensions between FUNCINPEC and the CPP, while Hun himself was holidaying in Vietnam (FT Asia Intelligence Wire 1997; Kevin 2000; Peou 2000: 376–8). Ranariddh fled to Paris, announcing a coup had taken place before a shot had been fired and calling for international intervention to depose Hun Sen and the renewal of civil war in league with the Khmer Rouge. FUNCINPEC’s war plan seemed to be to seize and hold Pochtenpong airport long enough for a hoped-for UN intervention force to arrive, while linking up with the Khmer Rouge at Anlong Veng (Deutsche Presse Agentur 1997a; Financial Times 1997b; Kevin 2000: 602; Kyodo 1997b).

Although some ASEAN states airlifted their nationals from Phnom Penh, ASEAN’s initial reaction to these events was to avoid any mention of a ‘coup’, echoing calls from Japan, Europe and the United States for the peaceful resolution of the conflict. ASEAN insisted that Cambodia’s entry to ASEAN, which (along with that of Laos and Burma) was due to be signed off later that month, would be unaffected. Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas stated: ‘in principle, the ASEAN commitment to admit the three countries has not changed’. Thailand’s Foreign Ministry insisted that the events ‘would not affect Phnom Penh’s scheduled entry into ASEAN …the admission of Cambodia has already been decided’ (Kyodo 1997c; Xinhua 1997c).
The bind of projection: the imposition of intervention

However, Washington, Japan and the European Union all insisted ASEAN use its ‘leverage’ to restore order. The United States was particularly insistent, offering ‘advice’ to ASEAN prior to the emergency ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) summoned to discuss the crisis and insisting ASEAN ‘coordinate’ its position with Washington. The United States swiftly suspended its humanitarian aid (followed by other donors) as a ‘clear signal to Hun Sen . . . that the US will not be conducting business as usual’ with him (BBC SWB (NHK TV) 1997; Guardian 1997; Kyodo 1997c; The Nation 1997d; Xinhua 1997c). The 10 July AMM joint statement (ASEAN 1997b) illustrated that ASEAN had bowed to this external pressure:

> While reaffirming the commitment to the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, [ASEAN] decided that, in the light of unfortunate circumstances which have resulted from the use of force, the wisest course of action is to delay the admission of Cambodia into ASEAN until a later date . . . The ASEAN countries stand ready to contribute their efforts to the peaceful resolution of the situation in Cambodia.

The United States, apparently unwilling to take direct action itself, was able to exploit ASEAN’s ‘projection without a project’, demanding that ASEAN’s claim to manage regional order be substantiated. Coming shortly after a huge furore over Burma’s planned accession to the Association, which severely damaged ASEAN–Western relations, and amidst growing dissatisfaction with ASEAN’s leadership role in the ARF,12 the Cambodian coup put ASEAN’s credibility on the line. ASEAN therefore assembled a ‘Troika’ comprising the Indonesian, Philippine and Thai foreign ministers, which assumed an uncomfortable mediating position not only between the warring factions but also between Cambodia and the West. The United States established the ‘Friends of Cambodia’ (FOC) group, comprising the major donor countries, ostensibly to ‘support’ ASEAN’s work, but in reality to supervise it. Washington insisted ASEAN ‘coordinate’ its position with the United States and vowed to ‘use its leverage’ to ensure Hun Sen was dealt with (Kyodo 1997a), with Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and her deputy Stanley Roth making frequent visits to and demands of ASEAN states. The fact that the Troika always met a day prior to FOC but did not release its statements until it had consulted with FOC the next day clearly illustrated the power dynamic at work.

The Troika’s first mission to Phnom Penh on 19 July generated considerable embarrassment because Hun Sen had already denounced ASEAN’s plans to ‘interfere in Cambodia’s internal affairs’, saying, ‘let us solve our problems on our own. Please stay out of our internal business.’ He publicly rejected its intervention again on the eve of their arrival. Ali Alatas
sought to get ASEAN off the hook, stating, ‘clearly, of this moment, our efforts will stop’, but it was not to be so easy (Deutsche Presse Agentur 1997b; Financial Times 1997a; New Straits Times 1997; Xinhua 1997a). Just as the Khmer Rouge and FUNCINPEC were re-launching costly civil war, the IMF suspended its US$120 million Structural Adjustment Programme, which comprised 20 per cent of the government’s budget, in addition to the 50 per cent constituted by now-suspended foreign aid. Donor withdrawal precipitated a collapse in investor confidence, with GNP growth slumping from 7 per cent in 1996 to zero by 1998. The ARF officially endorsed ASEAN’s lead on the issue and Washington piled pressure on Phnom Penh to invite ASEAN back, or lose international aid permanently. Further coercion was applied in September when Washington spearheaded a campaign to seat Ranariddh at the United Nations instead of Hun Sen’s candidate, producing an eventual compromise that left the seat vacant, thus stripping Cambodia once again of its international legitimacy. Under such circumstances it is unsurprising that the Troika was ‘invited’ to return, allowing ASEAN to operate coercively beneath the veneer of consent (Kevin 2000: 595–6; Xinhua 1997d).

Intervention was thus imposed on both Cambodia and ASEAN, turning ASEAN into the reluctant gatekeeper to Cambodia’s international rehabilitation. The following sections briefly summarize the form that intervention took, constituting ‘creeping conditionality’ for ASEAN membership – as soon as one condition was satisfied, another was imposed, largely because intervention not only failed to resolve the fundamental political conflicts that caused the crisis but also, in fact, exacerbated them.

**From ‘caretaker government’ to ‘free and fair elections’**

Despite Badawi’s promise that ASEAN would not act as the ‘international police’ by dictating to Cambodia and ‘would not put forward any proposal . . . because it may be misconstrued as interfering’ (Xinhua 1997b), the Troika did in fact put forward a ‘caretaker government’ proposal on its first visit to Phnom Penh. The suggestion that Hun Sen and Ranariddh both select deputies to run the government until elections scheduled for May 1998 were held was, as mentioned above, publicly denounced (Moller 1998: 1097; Peou 2000: 387).

Taking its cue from Washington – Albright stated that FOC’s role was ‘to support the ASEAN initiative and to work to achieve free and fair elections in 1998’ (United Press International 1997) – ASEAN therefore shifted tack at its special AMM on 11 August, calling for ‘free and fair elections’ involving ‘all political parties’, and offering technical assistance. Ranariddh had by then been replaced as FUNCINPEC leader by Ung Huot following a vote on 6 August, but ASEAN refused to accept this on the grounds that ‘ASEAN member states recognise states, not governments’ (ASEAN 1997a), a claim clearly falsified by ASEAN’s earlier policies on Cambodia.
However, Thailand’s refusal now to support the renewed insurgency, and the AMM’s emphasis on ‘holding elections in 1998 that outsiders will not be able to criticise’, illustrates well what was directly at stake: international credibility, rather than domestic social order (BBC SWB (National Voice of Cambodia) 1997; Peou 2000: 389).

ASEAN thus focused on encouraging the self-exiled politicians of FUNCINPEC and the opposition Sam Rainsy Party (SRP) to return home, mobilizing UN resources to safeguard their return, and putting forward ceasefire proposals to end the civil conflict. The sticking point was Hun Sen’s insistence on trying Ranariddh for his crimes (Antara 1997a, b). ASEAN’s efforts were, however, cut short by the Asian financial crisis, which, full-blown by October 1997, had devastating social, economic and political effects across the sub-region. The initiative largely passed from the Troika to Thailand, and Japan, which coordinated its efforts with ASEAN (The Nation 1997a). In talks in Tokyo in November, Hun Sen agreed to a range of proposals, including pardoning Ranariddh to facilitate his participation in elections, a ceasefire, and guarantees for the safety of returning self-exiles (Peou 2000: 397–8). Thailand stepped into the void left by the Troika by successfully pushing for the postponement of elections, visiting the factions and pressuring for a ceasefire, and offering direct mediation in Bangkok (Deutsche Presse Agentur 1998a; Kyodo 1998d; Mainchi Daily News 1997; The Nation 1997b, c). Hun Sen’s attempts to end the intervention in Cambodia by suggesting that ASEAN countries ‘should solve their own economic crises first’, and repeatedly hinting that he might withdraw Cambodia’s application to join ASEAN, were insufficient to rescue either side from the bind they found themselves in (Kyodo 1998c; Deutsche Presse Agentur 1997c). There was simply too much at stake for Cambodia, facing a plunge back into civil war with insufficient resources to fight off the Khmer Rouge, to block ASEAN’s interference. Ranariddh was eventually coerced into returning to Cambodia when the European Union, and then ASEAN, exploiting the room for manoeuvre this created (Washington opposed it), dropped their insistence on his personal participation as a condition for the recognition of election results (Deutsche Presse Agentur 1998g, h). After a ceasefire, trial date and pardon arrangements had been implemented, ASEAN states agreed to send eight election monitors each and to mobilize international financial support for the July 1998 elections (Deutsche Presse Agentur 1998f; Xinhua 1998d).

From elections to coalition formation

Alatas indicated there would be ‘no difficulties’ for Cambodia in gaining ASEAN membership after its elections (Agence France-Presse 1998b), a sentiment echoed by the other ASEAN foreign ministers (Asia Pulse 1997; Xinhua 1998b). Yet after the elections, a new condition was imposed: the formation of a coalition government. ASEAN’s interventions had merely forced Cambodia’s warring parties to participate in elections; they had not
resolved the fundamental political conflict underlying the events of July 1997. The CPP gained 41.4 per cent of the vote, FUNCINPEC 31.7 per cent and the SRP 14.3 per cent. While the CPP was thus the largest party, it lacked the parliamentary majority necessary to form a government and invited both opposition parties to form a coalition (Deutsche Presse Agentur 1998e). Rather than agreeing to negotiate, they exploited the international attention focused on Cambodia by rejecting the election results – certified by international observers as ‘free and fair’ (Deutsche Presse Agentur 1998d; Financial Times 1998) – holding demonstrations calling for armed international intervention to overthrow Hun Sen, and leaving the country to render the National Assembly inquorate and induce political paralysis (BBC SWB (Radio Australia) 1998; Christian Science Monitor 1998; Deutsche Presse Agentur 1998c; Phnom Penh Post 1998a, b). Rather than creating political peace and stability, ASEAN’s interventions had facilitated this paralysis by allowing Ranariddh a new lease of political life, despite his plotting with the Khmer Rouge to overthrow the democratically elected government, and granting FUNCINPEC and the SRP enhanced bargaining power. ASEAN’s new condition – the formation of a coalition – both reflected the failure of intervention to bring stability to Cambodia, and exacerbated these problems.

In a statement on 9 September, ASEAN called for ‘all parties’ to ‘resolve their differences in the spirit of national reconciliation . . . through dialogue and consultation . . . so that Cambodia would soon form a new government that fulfils the aspirations of the Cambodian people and the desire of the countries in the region’ (Xinhua 1998a; emphasis added). Given that ASEAN states were themselves succumbing to international intervention in the form of predatory IMF ‘rescue’ packages (see Feldstein 1998; Robison et al. 2000; Thakur 2000), ASEAN relied on Thailand’s Sukhumbhand Paribatra to carry out intensive shuttle diplomacy between the parties, pushing them to enter into negotiations, backed by Japan, the European Union and the United States. Sukhumbhand was eventually able to manoeuvre the factions into negotiations under Sihanouk, with a coalition agreement finally being announced three months after the elections. The extra leverage afforded by external intervention allowed Ranariddh to hold out for half the ministerial posts and the position of President of the National Assembly for himself (Bangkok Post 1998; The Nation 1998; Xinhua 1998c). A deal was also struck to create a Senate, to be chaired by a CPP official.

**From coalition formation to Senate establishment**

Badawi claimed that ‘no more issues’ would block Cambodian membership after the formation of a government (Bernama 1998), but as soon as the coalition deal was announced, ASEAN changed its conditions again in a further reflection of its unwillingness to take responsibility for Cambodia. After the AMM on 14 November, the Thai Foreign Ministry indicated that membership would now be conditional upon the constitutional amendment
required to create the Senate (Kyodo 1998b). The new condition was explained by reference to continued fears for Cambodia’s stability, with the Philippines noting there could be more ‘fighting among them. We will have to resolve it again. Others are saying “didn’t we get burned there already?” (Agence France-Presse 1998a). As the Straits Times noted, Cambodia’s entry could expose ASEAN to ‘recrimination’ if the situation came ‘unstuck’, which would ‘damage ASEAN’s credibility’, especially in the wake of the financial crisis. The newspaper, often taken to express official sentiment in Singapore, suggested Cambodia needed the ‘discipline and restraint imposed by probation’, which should be extended for another year, with targets to ‘put the government’s integrity to the test’, including the formation of a Senate, military reform and the handling of international aid (Straits Times 1998b).

The Singaporean government had aroused Indonesia’s wrath by insisting during the financial crisis that Jakarta should abide by the strictures of the Structural Adjustment Programme imposed upon it (Henderson 1999: 62). With these strictures ‘striking at the heart’ of Indonesia’s social, economic and political power relations (Robison and Rosser 2001: 179), it is perhaps unsurprising that Indonesia struck out at continued conditionality for Cambodia. Alatas asked:

since when should ASEAN sit in judgement about how governments work and make it a condition for entry? Did we do that when Vietnam entered, or Laos, or Myanmar, or before that Brunei Darussalam? We never said, ‘Well, I hope your government works and we will just see first . . .’ I mean, this an additional conditionality [sic] that moves towards internal interference.

(Deutsche Presse Agentur 1998b)

Malaysia, Brunei, Laos and Vietnam felt similarly, and the re-seating of Cambodia at the United Nations in December reduced ASEAN’s leverage substantially. Singapore’s Goh Chok Tong continued to insist on conditionality (Straits Times 1998a), publicly refuted by Alatas (Kyodo 1998a).14 The bizarre face-saving compromise produced at ASEAN’s Hanoi summit in December reflected ASEAN’s deep disunity, with Cambodia being admitted to ASEAN but its formal admission ceremony being delayed until the Senate was formed (ASEAN 1998; Severino 2006: 64). This resulted in ASEAN’s intervention outlasting that of the international donors, who began to negotiate new aid packages in February. That month, Sukhumbhand embarked on yet another mission to Phnom Penh to push for swift progress on the Senate (Kyodo 1999), and with the constitutional amendment finally in place, Cambodia was formally admitted to ASEAN in April 1999, completing its international rehabilitation and ending ASEAN’s intervention in that country.15

**Conclusion**

ASEAN intervened in Cambodian affairs repeatedly over the twenty-year period considered by this article, undermining the claims of subaltern realism
and constructivists that Third World states are passionately attached to an abstract principle of sovereignty. ASEAN’s emphasis on non-intervention was ultimately a political rather than a normative principle, expressing a defence of weak, capitalist regimes from subversion by separatist or communist movements being sponsored by outside powers. Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia threatened not simply an abstract principle of sovereignty (which ASEAN was not prepared to defend) but the political principle of the survival of ASEAN’s non-communist regimes. The intervention that followed illustrated ASEAN elites’ determination to defend the economic and political status quo. A similar argument could explain ASEAN’s defence of Indonesia’s annexation of East Timor in 1975.

ASEAN’s interests in re-intervening in Cambodia in the post-Cold War era are much less clear. A basic interest in regional ‘stability’ and the safeguarding of investments in Cambodia do not seem sufficient to explain the institution of conditionality for membership in the Association for the first and last time in the group’s history. Compared to ASEAN’s earlier interventions – vociferous diplomatic campaigning, the formation of counter-regimes and the arming and supporting of guerrilla movements – ‘creeping conditionality’ was a rather tame approach, resisted by some of its members, that reflected ASEAN’s diminished interests. It was ASEAN’s claim to manage regional order that allowed external actors to compel it to intervene in the conflict, or risk this claim being discredited, with possible attendant consequences for the autonomy of ASEAN’s regimes in the face of global pressures. ASEAN has similarly been urged in recent years to push Burma towards democracy, and again it has had little choice but to comply, however ineffectually and reluctantly. ASEAN has been very reluctant to take on responsibility for problems arising within its new states; but the West’s own refusal to take on these problems directly itself, preferring to use ASEAN to do its ‘dirty work’, suggests a similar reluctance to exercise power in the absence of obvious interests.

Acknowledgements

For helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper the author is grateful to Andrew Hurrell, Alastair Fraser, Christopher Bickerton, the participants of the Sovereignty and its Discontents workshop on Southern Responses to the New Interventionism (Oxford, November 2006), and two anonymous reviewers.

Notes

1 Such remarks were entirely typical (Dibb 2001: 834; Hernandez 1998; Kao and Kaplan 2000; Ramcharan 2000; Sucharithanarugse 2000: 60).

2 The first was supposedly the explicit support lent to Corazon Aquino’s government in the Philippines in 1986 and the attendant call for a peaceful political solution to the ongoing socio-political crisis there.
3 As is relatively common in studies of ASEAN, and particularly given the politically sensitive nature of this topic and the lack of secondary material on some parts of the period, it has been necessary at times to rely on newspaper accounts to reconstruct a narrative in the absence of access to government archives. Wherever possible, triangulation was used to help confirm accounts, and multiple sources are often cited. As with any such research, the narrative and conclusions are subject to the subsequent revelation of any more authoritative official documents.

4 There is no space here to fully rehearse the history behind these events. Briefly, the US intervention in and bombing of Cambodia emiserated and radicalized the population, pushing them into the arms of the Khmer Rouge, a Left-wing guerrilla group opposing the US-backed Lon Nol dictatorship. The Khmer Rouge swept to power in 1975 with Vietnamese and Chinese assistance, renaming the Kingdom of Cambodia ‘Democratic Kampuchea’ (DK; ‘Kampuchea’ being closer to the phonetic sound of the country in Khmer – the two names are used interchangeably in this article as they were during the period). But almost immediately after cementing his dominance, Pol Pot, in league with China (which Vietnam had turned against because of Beijing’s excessive interference) began attacking Vietnam and persecuting ethnic Vietnamese citizens as part of a genocidal campaign claiming 1.7 million lives. Vietnam was forced into an alliance with Moscow and invaded Cambodia alongside a rebel Khmer Rouge faction that had previously staged an unsuccessful revolt against Pol Pot before fleeing to Vietnam. Hanoi had previously defended the Khmer Rouge regime in international forums, unsuccessfully seeking a modus vivendi with Pol Pot. Its motives in invading were not so much humanitarian (though it clearly had positive results for the Cambodian people), as self-interested – the goal being to remove a dangerous regime that menaced Vietnam’s borders constantly with significant loss of life and food security.

5 These notations indicate UN documents. A indicates the General Assembly, 34 indicates the 34th session (1979), PV indicates provisional verbatim record, and the final number indicates the meeting number, followed by the page number.

6 It is important to note, as Robison and Goodman et al. (1996) do, that the growth of urban middle classes in the region did not automatically produce demands for liberal democracy, as mainstream theorists of democratization expected. Often the middle classes were in fact highly bound up in the illiberal power structures that had helped create them via massive state intervention. Nevertheless, these changes generally produced rising demand for political participation in some way, as well as protests against corruption and inefficiencies that hampered middle-class business interests.

7 Some constructivists argue that the goal is in fact to ‘socialize’ China. Johnston (2003) provides the most convincing argument along these lines, but only succeeds in showing that a small office of bureaucrats has been effectively ‘socialized’. In any case such arguments are post hoc rationalizations of the ARF and ASEAN’s incapacity to actually use the ARF to solve any concrete problems, ignoring the proximate causes of the ARF’s establishment.

8 By the mid-1990s there were over 220 meetings per year under ASEAN auspices. This presents a heavy diplomatic load for any developing country, particularly those targeted for ASEAN membership, which had few officials capable of speaking English (the international language of the region), and sometimes could not afford the initial membership contribution of US$1 million (and then US$750,000 per annum thereafter). Cambodia did not even have embassies in the majority of ASEAN countries by 1997.

9 The military benefited hugely from the black market trade made possible only by continued conflict and the embargo of legitimate cross-border trade. China was also alarmed by the shift and publicly denounced it for fear that it was a
The Pacific Review

544

prelude to cutting assistance to its Khmer Rouge client and excluding it from the ongoing peace process. Beijing welcomed the 1991 Thai military coup against Chutichai as ‘correct and just’, and coup leader General Suchinda called Pol Pot a ‘nice guy’ (Kiernan 1993: 218; 2002: 488). However, social change in Thailand, including the rise of the middle class and the demise of communism as a threat that could legitimize military rule, meant that the military regime was beaten back and democracy restored by 1993. Although the Thai military continued to assist the Khmer Rouge until at least 1995, with serious consequences for the peace process (Buszynski 1994: 731; Doyle and Suntharalingam 1994: 144–5; Findlay 1995: 4, 94, 166–7; Frost 1991: 130; Heinberger 1994: 2; Jennar 1994: 150), its dominance had been broken and the politics of economic predation superseded the ‘red scare’.

10 The Khmer Rouge had refused to canton and disarm as required by the Paris Agreements, while the Cambodian government and the remaining resistance factions had. When the Khmer Rouge boycotted the 1993 elections and resumed its hostilities, it was thus able to make massive gains, controlling or imperilling up to half of the country by 1994. The renewed civil war cost the Cambodian government US$185 million, a third of its national budget, which was clearly unsustainable (Kevin 2000: 600, n. 9; Peou 2000: 240). While Hun Sen favoured selective amnesties, conditional upon the cessation of military and political activities, to encourage defections from the Khmer Rouge (a scheme that proved most controversial with the West but which had actually achieved its goal by the end of the 1990s), by May 1997 Ranariddh was suggesting bringing the Khmer Rouge directly back into Cambodian national politics. See http://www.geocities.com/khmerchronology/1995.htm

11 This was the account favoured by Western media at the time and much academic writing since (e.g. Moller 1998: 1097; Peou 2000: 298).

12 For instance, to China’s delight, ASEAN refused to allow the ARF to discuss directly the emerging territorial conflicts in the South China Sea in 1995. US Assistant Secretary of State Winston Lord said this called into question whether the ARF was a ‘credible organization’. Japan was also looking for a forum to actually make progress on Northeast Asian security issues, while the United States even suggested transforming APEC into a defence forum because it was so dissatisfied with the ARF (Buszynski 1998: 572–5).

13 ASEAN claimed to oppose the move, but apparently dared not vote against it, since the UNGA endorsed the compromise without a vote (A/52/PV.76).

14 Singapore’s views remained particularly important since it held the chair of the ASEAN Standing Committee, tasked with organizing ASEAN’s business, which in this case included the organization of the official membership ceremony for Cambodia.

15 However, Cambodia’s long-term emiseration, to which ASEAN’s interventions clearly contributed by helping prolong armed conflict, has transformed the country into the ‘playground’ of international NGOs who seek to dictate government policy and manage democratic contestation (Dosch 2006: 141–60; Hughes forthcoming)

References

L. Jones: ASEAN intervention in Cambodia

Agence France-Presse (1998a) 21 November.
—— (1998b) 16 March.
Antara (1997a) 23 October.
—— (1997b) 3 October.
ASEAN (1967) ASEAN Declaration, Bangkok.
—— (1971) ZOPFAN Declaration, Kuala Lumpur.
—— (1979) Joint Communiqué of the 12th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Bali.
—— (1997b) Joint Statement of the Special Meeting of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers on Cambodia, Kuala Lumpur.
Asia Pulse (1997) 26 July.
Bangkok Post (1979) 1 February.
BBC SWB (Radio Australia) (1998) 1 August.


Daily Telegraph (1979a) 17 April.
—— (1979b) 11 January.

Deutsche Presse Agentur (1997a) 10 July.
—— (1997b) 18 July.
—— (1997c) 9 December.
—— (1998a) 22 January.
—— (1998b) 11 December.
—— (1998c) 7 October.
—— (1998d) 26 July.
—— (1998e) 30 July.
—— (1998f) 23 March.
—— (1998g) 5 March.


—— (1997a) 11 July.
—— (1997b) 8 July.

Financial Times Asia Intelligence Wire (1997) 7 July.


International Herald Tribune (1979) 30 July.

Japan Times (1981) 15 September.


Kyodo (1997a) 24 July.
—– (1997b) 11 July.
—– (1997c) 6 July.
—– (1998a) 16 December.
—– (1998b) 14 November.
—– (1998c) 12 January.
—– (1998d) 29 January.


—– (1997a) 10 November.
—– (1997b) 20 November.
—– (1997c) 31 December.
—– (1997d) 11 July.


—— (1979b) 1 June.

Observer (1979) 1 July.


Phnom Penh Post (1998a) 2 October.

—— (1998b) 18 September.


Straits Times (1979a) 2 February.

—— (1979b) 27 April.


The Pacific Review


Xinhua (1982a) 22 June.
——— (1982b) 14 June.
——— (1997a) 19 July.
——— (1997b) 11 July.
——— (1997c) 7 July.
——— (1997d) 21 July.
——— (1998a) 9 September.
——— (1998c) 16 September.
——— (1998d) 3 April.

Yomiuri Shinbun (1979) 9 July.